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This paper reports first results from a survey of 404 middle-sized and large manufacturing 
firms from 40 Russian regions in April-June 2003. We examine the extent of social 
service and infrastructure provision by the firms and the firms’ assessment of the quality 
of public infrastructure and the regulatory environment. Background information of 
ownership, investment, performance, competition, and finance decisions of the firms is 
also gathered.  
 
The data reveal that despite major divestments of social services during 1990s, a great 
majority of firms still provide at least some form of social services. For example, 56% of 
the firms have their own housing or support local housing, and 73% of the firms have 
recreation facilities or support employee’s recreation activities. While managers view the 
social service provision as non-essential and costly, many of the firms continue to provide 
these services, even to users other than their own workforce.  
 
The quality of public infrastructure is generally assessed as being good or satisfactory; the 
respondents were the least satisfied with the quality of roads. Over a half of the firms 
provide their own heat, but mainly due to technological reasons – although public service 
interruptions do occur – and 24% of the firms give support to the maintenance and 
construction of public road network.  
 
The regulatory burden the firms face continues to be severe. In more than half of the 
firms, for example, the general manager has to spend more than two weeks in 
negotiations about public infrastructure with the authorities.  
 
These descriptive results indicate that there is still a lot scope for improvement in the 
quality and quantity of public service provision in Russia. Enterprises are still engaged 
rather heavily in social service provision, road network would require improvements, and 
the easing of regulatory burden should continue. Addressing these questions is likely to 
be vital for the sustainability of investments and growth in Russia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
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This paper reports the first results from the project “Infrastructure and Welfare Services 
in Russia: Enterprises as Beneficiaries and Service Providers”. The results are based on a 
firm survey conducted among large Russian enterprises during in April-June 2003. The 
background of the project is the question as to why the Russian economy has been 
lagging behind the economies of most of the other Central and Eastern European 
countries. We approach the question by looking at the relationship between firms and 
authorities at the regional level in Russia. 
 
Public infrastructure and public services are crucial for sustainable development. They are 
needed both for enhancing growth and for ensuring that benefits from growth reach the 
whole population. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2004 entitled “Making 
Services Work for the Poor” outlines the role of public services in eradicating poverty. 
Firms’ incentives to invest are e.g. reduced if their access to electricity is subject to daily 
blackouts. The same applies to basic services like health care and primary education: 
basic deficiencies in these services reduce the quality of the labor force and create social 
imbalances. 
 
This study focuses on public sector delivery (infrastructure and social services) because it 
has been found to be the major obstacle to firm investment and growth in many 
developing countries. Reinikka and Svensson (2002) give evidence on the critical role of 
public infrastructure in firms’ investments in developing countries, a theme elaborated on 
by Reinikka and Collier (2001)1. These factors have not been systematically studied in 
transition economies, despite the fact that they have been recognized as being crucial to 
understanding the state of the Russian economy2.  Public service provision by firms has 
been studied through only one firm survey, which was conducted in Russia in 19943. 
 
This paper offers a descriptive analysis of the scope, level, and funds invested in social 
services and infrastructure provision by enterprises. In later studies we will analyze, first, 
                                                 
1 The evidence on the role of infrastructure and public capital in rich countries is more controversial 
(Hansson and Henreksson 1994, Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz 1994). But clearly, the issue in developing 
countries is whether infrastructure exists at all, not whether one should build a new turnpike. 
2 Brown and Earle (2001) is to the best of our knowledge the only study on the role of infrastructure on firm 
performance in Russia. Estrin et. al. (1997) consider the role of social benefits in wage setting in Poland. 
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how public sector services (in particular social welfare services and infrastructure) and 
the behaviour of the public sector (regulation, taxation, corruption) influence firm 
performance. Performance may be measured in a number of ways, including productivity, 
sales (including exports), profits, investment, and restructuring. The impact of public 
sector delivery will be examined while controlling at the same time for determinants that 
were found to be important in earlier firm surveys.  Examples of such determinants 
include access to finance, indicators of corporate governance, ownership structure, and 
privatisation. Second, we will examine the reasons for social service and infrastructure 
provision by firms, as well as how private provision depends on geographical location, 
the politics of the firm’s region, the structure of the labour market, firm size, ownership 
structure, and a few other variables. 
 
During the Soviet era, both the supply of public services and the building and maintaining 
of the infrastructure were delegated to enterprises. Enterprises maintained kindergartens, 
schools, health centers, and vacation homes. This was natural, given the organization of 
production in the Soviet economy. The system hoped to reap economies of scale by 
designating certain regions to specialize in the production of a small variety of goods in 
large plants. In these regions, nearly everyone was employed by the single, local, large 
producer. Hence, in a way, there was no distinction between the government and the firm. 
After the collapse of the Soviet system, enterprises continued to supply public services 
and to maintain the infrastructure. This was necessary because enterprises basically 
owned all the facilities and housing. 
 
The next section reviews the research regarding the relationship between firms and the 
public sector in Russia. Section 3 lays out the basic statistics from our sample, as well as 
facts about the sampling procedure.  Section 4 presents data on firms’ provision of social 
services; section 5 presents data on infrastructure; and section 6 presents data on firms’ 
relationships with authorities (regulatory framework). Section 7 focuses on interesting 
correlations we have found in the data, and section 8 presents conclusions. All the Tables 
and Figures referred to in the main text can be found in the appendices. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
3Recent firm surveys are reported in Angelucci et. al. (2002) and in Brown and Earle (2003). The only 
survey covering firms’ provision of social benefits was conducted in 1994 (Commander and Schankerman 
1997, Commander, Fan and Schaffer 1996). 
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2. Firms and the public sector in Russia 
 
The interaction between firms and the public sector is important everywhere in the world. 
Particularly in Russia the relationship has significantly shaped the transition process. It 
has been characterized both by firms benefiting from subsidies (soft budget constraints) 
and by the attempts of the authorities to reap benefits from firms through bribes and 
excessive regulation (Roland 2000, Shleifer and Vishny 2000). 
 
In Russia there is plenty of evidence of public authorities restricting entry to preserve 
monopoly rents subsidizing firms whose employment or other characteristics are 
important for political reasons or for rent-seeking purposes (Ponomareva and 
Zhuravskaya 2000, Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin and Zhuravskaya 2003, Slinko, 
Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2003, and Gehlbach 2003). There is evidence of the 
authorities regulating and harassing firms, especially small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, to extract rents by means of bribes (Frye and Zhuravskaya 2000, Frye 2002, 
Monitoring of Administrative Barriers to Small Business Growth 2002, and Sonin 2003). 
 
What is the role of firms’ public service provision? Provision may help large firms to 
increase their monopoly power in local labor markets (Friebel and Guriev 2000). 
Provision of services by firms can reduce labor market flexibility by helping to establish 
dual labor markets (Grosfeld et. al. 1999). Service provision can restrict entry by new 
firms, since old firms have “free” facilities either from Soviet times or from insider 
ownership of firms (Commander and Schankerman 1997). None of these explanations 
directly incorporates the public sector’s incentives to allow service provision through 
firms. One possibility is that authorities want to enhance firms’ market power in goods 
and labor markets to create extractable rents. Local authorities’ incentives may also be 
affected by the relationships among the various levels of government. 
 
Fiscal relations between federal, regional, and local governments in Russia 
The relationships among the various layers of government have gone through several 
changes since the breakdown of the Soviet system4. Regional authorities received and 
appropriated extensive powers in the early 1990’s despite an attempt to increase federal 
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power. The early 1990’s was a period of almost uncontrolled decentralization. This 
process was brought under regulations beginning in 1993, when the prevailing structure 
was legalized. The resulting system can be called asymmetric federalism (Martinez-
Vasquez 2002) or bargaining federalism (Gelman 2002). In this system, the center-region 
relationships were characterized by bilateral center-region treaties and regional lobbying. 
 
One of the reasons for the decentralization and the system of regional privileges, which 
began in the early 1990s, was the desire to appease regions that were threatening to 
secede from the Federation. In this case, regions that were hostile to the federal 
authorities were treated favorably. Later, there may have been a move towards a system 
in which regions loyal to the central government received a privileged position. 
Regardless, the federal system was not able to equalize incomes among the regions 
(Golovanova 2003). 
 
This system remained until the end of 1990’s; it was extensively reformed by president 
Putin in 2000. Those reforms substantially increased the power of the federal authorities 
and reduced the power of regional and sub-national authorities. Though the regional 
authorities fought against the reforms, there are signs that the reforms are having an effect 
(Kahn 2002). 
 
Currently, only the fiscal relationships between federal and regional authorities (subjects 
of Federation) are, at least in principle, well defined in Russia (Kurlyandskaya 2002). The 
same does not hold true for the fiscal relationships between federal and/or regional 
authorities and various sub-regional governments. Federal legislation applies only to 
regional governments and one level of local authorities. Regional authorities have the 
complete right to choose whether or not they recognize other levels of local authorities, 
which naturally creates many different arrangements, some of which may even contradict 
legislation (Kurlyandskaya 2002).  
 
In principle, local autonomy has been very weak. Many sub-regional governments rely 
heavily on transfers from regional and federal authorities. Currently, local autonomy is 
essentially legally non-existent, as almost all the tax rates and expenditure requirements 
                                                                                                                                                  
4 See Gelman (2002), Kurlyandskaya (2002) Martinez-Vasquez (2002), and Lavrov, Litwack, and 
Sutherland (2001). 
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are set at the federal level. Yet local governments possess considerable informal power. 
This may be one of the reasons why local authorities rarely complain about the situation 
(Kurlyandskaya 2002). 
 
The most significant source of tax revenue at both the regional level and the local level is 
revenue from taxes shared with the federal government; it accounts for more than 50 % of 
total revenues. Transfers from higher-level governments account for, on average, 20-30 % 
(with the share declining lately) of the revenue, though the regional variation is huge. 
 
Fiscal relationships, public service delivery, and firms 
The system of regional autonomy with formal, local non-autonomy can be seen as a 
major source of problems in the Russian economy. Shleifer and Treisman (2000) have 
presented the most influential argument for this assessment. They argue that this system 
has supplied all the sub-national authorities with incentives to engage in rent extraction. 
Given that shared taxes are a major source of revenue, the problem of the commons arises 
where resources are devoted to fight for the revenue and to divert revenue for own use 
and away from everybody else. At the local and regional levels, it is understood that if 
they locally get only a share of the tax revenue collected, then it is beneficial to divert the 
revenue from higher level authorities. With large powers devoted to the regional 
authorities, this is certainly feasible. 
 
This system also has implications for the relationships between firms and authorities. As 
noted above, one way to divert tax revenue is to extort payments from the firms indirectly 
by means of charging various extra fees and directly by blackmailing. This practice 
naturally shrinks the tax base, but is viewed as the optimal solution by sub-national 
authorities. However, this system does not offer an efficient means to collect revenue and 
certainly has implications for the regional and local provision of public services. In this 
system, authorities are biased towards subsidizing firms that are seen as a source of rents, 
while they are biased against protecting firms from corruption (Gehlbach 2003)5. 
 
These problems are aggravated by the lack of local autonomy, which increases incentives 
for local authorities to use firms as a source of revenue, especially when expenditures 
                                                 
5 Timofeev (2002) argues also that local authorities are more sensitive to local “pressures” increasing the 
problem in regions with higher degree of sub-regional decentralization. 
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dictated by federal authorities cannot be met. This situation also reduces incentives to 
efficiently provide public services (Litwack 2003). An additional source of inefficiency 
arises when local revenues are independent of local policies. This happens if 
municipalities’ income comes from sources such as tax sharing and as changes in 
transfers from higher level governments6. In this case, local authorities do not have any 
incentive to efficiently produce public services. Zhuravskaya (2000) provides evidence 
for this mechanism. Her results have been partly challenged by Alexeev and 
Kurlyandskaya (2003), who argue that the marginal tax rates for own revenue are below 
100 % and that the source of inefficiency is the inability of regional authorities to commit 
to efficient incentive contracts. But the main point of under-provision of local public 
goods remains. 
 
The previous situation does not allow for the possibility of diverting taxes at the local 
level. Empirically, this is a significant phenomenon (Kurlyandskaya 2002, Lavrov, 
Litwack, and Sutherland 2001, and Sonin 2003). One possible route for diversion is to 
make local enterprises provide public services in exchange for reduced taxes or increased 
tax arrears7. Haaparanta and Juurikkala (2002) have amended the model in Zhuravskaya 
(2000) with this possibility. Their major finding is that tax diversion can lead to 
inefficiency in terms of overprovision of some public goods. It is also a simple way to 
model why, in the current situation, it may be optimal at the local level to provide public 
services through firms. 
 
In summary, there may be different reasons as to why firms at the local level provide 
services. From the point of view of public finance, the main reason may be the prevailing 
fiscal relationships among the different layers of government. However, it must also be 
remembered that, in advanced capitalist countries, firms also provide services to their 
employees. In Russia, enterprises may be doing it for the exact same reasons as firms in 
advanced capitalist countries. 
 
Current knowledge on public service provision by Russian firms  
Social services 
                                                 
6 Transfers to a municipality decline when its revenues increase. 
7 See also Tonis (2003). 
 9
According to Leksin and Shvetsov (1998, 1999), in 1992, 33.3 percent of the total 
housing stock in Russia was privately owned (mostly individual houses). The rest was 
considered public housing and included municipal housing (25.7 percent of total housing 
stock) and departmental (vedomstvennoe) housing that existed within enterprises (41 
percent of total housing stock). Thus, substantial part of the state owned housing existed 
within the enterprises and they also provided dormitories to their workers. The amount of 
social spending by enterprises in 1992 was the equivalent of almost 4% of GDP. Before 
reforms started, over half of all workers enjoyed some social services provided by 
enterprises. The services provided by metallurgy, oil and gas, automobile and machine 
building industries were especially renowned for their good quality and wide quantity. In 
1994 one third of the firms with fewer than 500 employees provided housing, the share 
increasing to 100% for enterprises with more than 10 000 employees. In the beginning of 
1990’s, some 70% of large and medium-sized enterprises offered medical services while 
over 75% of large and 50% of medium-sized enterprises had kindergartens. 
 
Commander and Schankerman (1997) report that by 1994 firms had reduced their social 
assets but, 25-35 % of them still provided services at a level comparable to the pre-
transition level. Comparing the years 1990/1991 and 1994/1995, 36 % of firms reduced 
the scope of provision, 47 % maintained it, and 17 % increased it. Interestingly, new 
firms also provided services. Privatized and state-owned companies were similar in terms 
of scope of provision. Larger firms were less likely to reduce the number of benefits. 
 
The quality of the services provided by the enterprise sector was generally better than that 
provided by municipal services. As Leksin and Shvetsov (1998) note, real expenses per 
child in enterprise-owned kindergartens were 30-50% higher those in the municipal 
sector. In Soviet times, enterprises also had sport and culture facilities, and sometimes 
they financially supported entire sports teams and vacations at resorts. 
 
Basic legal documents requiring divestiture of housing and the main part of social assets 
within 6 months after the enterprise was privatized were adopted in 1992-1993. A 
gradualist approach was taken in the sense that instead of immediate privatization, the 
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assets were to be divested to the local authorities, which were made responsible for the 
provision of the services.8 
 
The transfer of social assets was supposed to be done by the end of 1997 and indeed the 
majority of assets were transferred. Roughly 80% of housing stock, 76% of kindergartens, 
82% of medical services, 84% sports facilities, 75% of children’s summer camps, 60 - 
70% of recreation facilities became municipal during 1993-1997. The variation between 
regions, and especially between municipalities, was, however, very large, as the share of 
municipalized assets might vary between 15% and 100%. 
 
According to Leksin and Shvetsov, in 1998, practically in all Russian regions enterprises’ 
social infrastructure had already long ago become semi-municipal. Up to 50% of those 
who used enterprises’ social services (housing, kindergartens) were not employees of that 
enterprise. Thus, firms financed municipal social infrastructure. 
 
According to Starodubrovskaya (2002), more than 90% of enterprise housing and other 
social assets had been accepted to municipal ownership at the time of writing. The author 
accredits the success in asset transfer to a large extent to the 1.5% turnover tax introduced 
in 1995-1996 to finance housing and social facilities. As long as enterprises continued to 
hold the social assets on their balance, they could deduct their social expenditures from 
this tax. Before its abolishment in the 2000 tax reform, it created a mechanism allowing 
municipalities to receive additional funding after transfer with no mediation of the 
regional or federal governments, and was actually the “only serious local tax in the 
Russian tax system”. After the tax reform, federal subsidies remained the only source of 
financial compensation for housing accepted in the ownership of municipalities. 
 
The pace of divestiture in different locations varied considerably. Starodubrovskaya 
(2002) argues that this is a result of complex relationships and incentive structures 
between the main players- enterprise management, local and regional governments, 
sometimes trade unions, and different groups of population. As the IMF study puts 
it:”Housing and communal services are characterized by pervasive implicit subsidies and 
other non-market features. Cost recovery levels for housing and communal services are 
low; for example, operational cost recovery for public housing maintenance is estimated 
                                                 
8 See Appendix 1 for the legal basis of the transfer of social assets from the firms to the municipalities 
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at below 50 % (1999); for heating, water and sewage at 35% (2000); for gas at 50% 
(2000); and for electricity at 40% (2000). Utility tariffs are partly cross-subsidized, with 
industrial consumers subsidizing low tariffs for the household sector. In addition, public 
housing construction – which in 2000 still accounted for 20% of all residential housing 
construction by area – as well as publicly organized housing maintenance remain 
characterized by the absence of market-based and transparent tendering procedures.” 
(IMF 2002) These remarks serve as a good starting point to our research. 
 
Energy infrastructure 
Electric power and natural gas play a significant role in the Russian economy. Both 
sectors have one large player: RAO UES in electricity and Gazprom in natural gas 
generation and distribution. The two companies together account for a large share of tax 
revenues, both at federal and regional levels. They played prominent roles in the virtual 
economy (see Gaddy and Ickes 1998), which was characterized by barter and other non-
monetary means of payments. Domestic energy prices are still controlled and there is 
significant cross-subsidization in the virtual economy. 
 
Tariffs for wholesale and transmission are regulated by the government through the 
recently-established Single Tariff Authority. Retail tariffs for both electricity and heat are 
regulated by regional energy commissions (REC) or, where they do not exist, directly by 
regional governments. In both cases, regional administrations continue to have a 
dominant influence in setting retail tariffs. In general, local and regional administrations 
may greatly influence the decisions made by the energo in its jurisdiction. ”They have 
control over a number of variables important to utilities firms, including local distribution 
networks, price regulation, taxation, the ability to pressure consumers to make payments, 
and the ability to protect organizations from bankruptcy. Explicit negotiated and 
renegotiated comprehensive bilateral agreements between regional authorities and utilities 
are common.” (OECD 2002.) 
 
In most regions, there is still an additional structure between energos and the final 
consumers. Nominally independent local distribution companies (oblkommunenergo) 
control parts of the low voltage grid, purchase electricity from energos, and resell it to 
consumers. These companies are often under the control of regional or local 
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administrations, thus giving them additional leverage in negotiations with both electricity 
companies and final users (local industry). 
 
Further, Gazprom was established in 1992 as a state-owned, joint-stock company. 
Currently, it has de facto monopoly control over major processing plants and gas exports 
and over gas pipelines, excluding smaller local distribution networks. The majority of 
local networks still continue to be controlled by municipalities or regional governments, 
which creates a situation parallel to electricity delivery. However, regional companies are 
absent from natural gas distribution. Thus, in most regions Gazprom affiliates 
(Mezhregiongaz or others) sell directly to industrial users, either through their own 
pipelines or through local distribution lines. 
 
 
3. Survey Design and Implementation and Sample Description 
 
 
3.1. Survey Design and Implementation 
 
Questionnaire 
The preparation of the survey started more than a year before the actual survey was 
carried out, with background readings on topics related to public goods provision, fiscal 
federalism, welfare services, and infrastructure. In preparing the questionnaire, we 
utilized the experiences of previous enterprise surveys made in Russia and elsewhere. We 
also conducted interviews with leading Russian experts in the sphere of social service 
provision, municipal reform (in particular, transfer of social assets from the firms to the 
municipalities), enterprise behavior, and performance. Finally, before launching the 
survey, we tested the questionnaire in three rounds of pilot interviews in three regions of 
Russia. As a result of these pilots, the survey was modified substantially.9 
 
Sample design 
Our study serves both the need for a general description, as well as the need for a more 
in-depth analysis of the causes and consequences of social service and infrastructure 
provision by the firms. Thus, we had two objectives. The first one was to obtain a sample 
                                                 
9 More detailed description of the questionnaire preparation and the pilots can be found in Appendix 2. The 
survey instrument is available from the authors by request.  
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of the Russian industrial sector that included firms of different industries, regions, and 
sizes. This kind of sample would serve the descriptive purpose of the study well. The 
second aim was to build a sample that would have some degree of variation in the main 
object of the study – social assets and infrastructure- in order to determine why some 
firms provide social services while others do not. 
 
In our sample design we tried to reach both objectives at least partially. Selecting firms 
with some degree of variation in their social services and infrastructure provision would 
have required a costly pre-screening procedure, as official statistics do not include 
information on these issues. Instead, we used the firm size (number of employees) as a 
proxy for the probability that a firm would provide social assets or infrastructure. It is 
natural to assume that larger firms are more likely to keep, for instance, housing, medical 
facilities or daycare facilities. The results of the pilots also supported this assumption. 
Consequently, the size of the firm is the main criterion in the sample construction. 
 
Sample frame 
The source of information for the population of firms is the enterprise registry maintained 
by Goskomstat (State Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics). Each firm is 
obliged to report its number of employees, output, profits, fixed capital and wages to 
Goskomstat. The registry database contains approximately 46,000 entries. Each firm in 
the database has a unique identifying number (OKPO). The database also contains the 
contact information and industry affiliation for each firm. At the time when our sample 
was constructed (spring 2003), the latest available dataset was for the year 2000. 
 
In the construction of our sample we concentrated on the industrial sector, and within it 
manufacturing firms for which energy production is not a regular line of business. We set 
a minimum size limit of 400 employees, as the pilots indicated that smaller firms are 
unlikely to provide infrastructure or social services.10 As the size of the firms is the 
defining criterion for our sampling procedure, we included only firms which report 
employment information for the year 2000 in the database. Information on the regional 
location of the firm should also be present. Thus, we surveyed medium and large 
manufacturing firms. Constructed in such a way, our sample frame contains 3523 firms. 
                                                 
10 By firm we mean establishment, which is also a separate legal entity, either an independent firm or a 
subsidiary of another firm, as long as it has own bookkeeping and has production in the same place it is 
registered. 
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Choice of regions 
There are 89 regions (subjects of federation) in Russia. Not all of them have industrial 
enterprises of interest to our study. Appendix 3 presents regions where firms from our 
sample frame are located, listing the number of firms in each region. From this list we 
further excluded regions that are not easily accessible (some northern and eastern 
regions), are in the zone of ethnic conflicts (Caucasian regions), or are not covered by our 
interviewer network. These regions are in italics in Appendix 3. 
  
From the remaining 63 regions we randomly selected 40 regions. Three of them - Amur 
oblast, the Republic of Khakasia, and Khanty-Mansi autonomous okrug – had too few 
firms in our sample frame, taking into account the expected refusal rate. We replaced 
them with three regions, drawn from large macro-regions, which were underrepresented 
in the initial selection. These are Irkutsk oblast, the Republic of Tatarstan, and Ulyanovsk 
oblast. The final selection of regions where the survey was carried out is also presented in 
Appendix 2 (in bold). The total number of firms from our sample frame in these 40 
regions is 2379.  
 
Choice of firms 
Our target sample size was 400 firms. We constructed the initial sample for each selected 
region in the following manner: all firms in the sample frame in a given region were 
ordered by size (number of employees), from largest to smallest. The initial sample 
included every sixth firm from these regional lists. In case the firm from the initial sample 
was not found or refused to be interviewed, it was to be replaced by the firm closest to its 
size from the list. All replacements were to be chosen from within the region where initial 
firm was located11. 
 
Constructed in such a way, the sample should reflect the size structure of the medium and 
large industrial enterprises in the region. The sample also likely includes firms from 
different industries even without any industry stratification. Industries with higher 
average firm size can be expected to be overrepresented.  Thus, our sampling technique 
includes a combination of clustering by region and systematic sampling by size.  
 
Fieldwork and data processing 
                                                 
11 In practice some regions did not fulfill regional quota due to high refusal rate and few replacement were 
made from other regions. 
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The survey was conducted in April – June 2003 by the survey firm GFK, which has a 
regional interviewer network. Before the start of the survey, a training session for 
representatives of the participating regional survey organizations was organized by the 
project team and the survey firm in Moscow.  These representatives then trained the 
interviewers who were to carry out the fieldwork. 
 
At an early stage of the survey, a control procedure was organized: project participants 
eye-checked questionnaires received up to that point for obvious mistakes or 
misunderstandings. All the questionnaires were eventually checked by GFK supervisors. 
At the end of the survey, control of interviewers’ work was conducted by phone. 
 
Data from the questionnaires was entered into electronic format twice, by independent 
typists. The two entries were compared in order to reveal entry mistakes. Finally, a 
cleaning program was devised in order to reveal inconsistencies among different parts of 
the questionnaire. Thus, control, checking, and cleaning procedures were devised in order 
to achieve the best possible quality data. 
 
3.2. Sample description 
 
Response rate  
In a survey of the medium and large industrial enterprises in Russia, one can expect a 
high refusal rate. Due to generally low informational transparency, Russian firms are 
suspicious of attempts to acquire information about their activities. Particularly sensitive 
questions include information on ownership structure, competition, and financial figures, 
such as sales, profits, taxes, and investment. It is also hard to reach top-level management 
of large firms. Each firm that was contacted during the survey received the letters of 
support from CEFIR and from the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.  
 
Out of  the list of 2379 firms, which includes 399 firms from the initial sample (see 
definition above) and the replacement firms, a total of 1017 firms were contacted. Out of 
these, 45 % refused to be interviewed (see Figure 3.1), 15 % were excluded for other 
reasons (not found, bankruptcy, firm had different identifier than in the database, or did 
not have any production facilities in the region), and 40 % of firms were actually 
surveyed. If we look at the initial sample of 399 firms, the picture is similar - 43 % 
refused to be interviewed and 42 % were surveyed. 
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Sample representativeness 
Next, we examined how our sample related to the population of Russian firms. We 
compared the industrial, regional, and size structures of our sample with that of the 
population12. Figure 3.2 presents the distribution of firms in the population and in the 
sample by industry. The majority of industries are adequately represented in terms of the 
share of the firms. Metallurgy and construction materials industries are overrepresented in 
our sample as compared to the population of firms. Share of firms in forestry and pulp 
and paper is underrepresented when compared to the economy as a whole. 
 
The fact that we surveyed medium and large enterprises explains the biased picture 
regarding the distribution of industrial employment (Figure 3.3)13. Metallurgical firms in 
our sample account for almost three times as high a share of employment as in the whole 
economy. The reason is that metallurgical firms are larger than firms in other industries 
(the average number of employees per firm in the metallurgy industry in our sample was 
4461, as compared to 1449 employees in the general economy). Share of employment in 
machine building is lower in our sample than both in the population and in the initial 
sample, meaning that refusal rate among large firms in this sector was higher than 
average. The energy and fuel sector share is low, as compared to the whole economy, due 
to the exclusion of energy production firms and extracting firms from the sample frame, 
implying that only fuel processing firms are present. 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of firms by the seven federal districts. In the Central, 
Urals, and Volga districts the share of firms in the sample is higher than in the population, 
meaning that there are relatively more medium and large manufacturing firms in those 
regions. North-Western, Southern, and Far East districts, on the contrary, have a lower 
share of firms in the sample. 
  
Finally, the distribution of the firms in the sample by size (number of employees) is 
reported in Table 3.1. The initial sample includes relatively fewer small firms (400-500 
employees), and more very large firms (more than 5000 employees) than the sample 
                                                 
12 By population we mean all Russian industrial firms as described in the Goskomstat (Russian statistical 
agency) yearbooks as of  year 2000 
13 In this chapter we use figures on employment for our sample from the Goskomstat database, not from the 
survey, because in the survey we asked for the total employment while Goskomstat gives figures only on 
industrial employment (promyshlenno-proizvodstvennyi personal). 
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frame. Due to the higher refusal rate among the largest firms, however, size distribution 
in the resulting sample is closer to the sample frame. The majority of the firms in our 
sample employ between 500 and 5000 employees. 
 
Origins and ownership structure  
The survey provides information on the year of origin and the organizational form of each 
firm. As was expected with medium and large manufacturing firms, most of them 
originated during the time before the transition period, and some of the firms existed even 
before the socialist revolution (see Table 3.2). Only 5 % of the firms in the sample are 
relatively new, as they were created during the 1990s. The majority of the firms in the 
sample are open joint stock companies (see Table 3.3), which is not surprising as most of 
the formerly state-owned firms were turned into open joint stock companies during the 
mass privatization of the early 1990s. Some 80 % of the sampled firms were privatized 
during 1991-1994. Altogether, 16 firms were always private, while 32 firms never went 
through privatization. 
 
According to Table 3.3, almost 7 % of the firms are in the form of a state (unitary) 
enterprise.  There are, however, more firms fully or partially controlled by the state (see 
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5). Approximately 40 % of the firms have some state ownership. 
Of these, state has still majority ownership in more than half of the firms. The average 
stake held by the state is around 15 %14. 
 
The extent of insider ownership which resulted from the mass privatization is continually 
decreasing. As Angelucci et al. show in their study of Russian firms, while at the time of 
privatization 79 % of firms were, for the most part, insider-owned, by the year 2000 this 
share reduced to 60 %. In our sample, as of the spring of 2003, only 27 % of firms were, 
for the most part, insider-owned. This reduction is due to decreasing worker ownership. 
In the Angelucci et al. (2002) study, at the time of privatization workers owned on 
average 54 % of shares. By 2000 this figure reduced to 34.5 %. In our sample, workers 
own on average 18 % of shares. Although some retired worker-owners can be in the 
“other persons” category, the figure is still quite low. 
 
                                                 
14 Given generally low informational transparency and unwillingness of firms to reveal their ownership 
structure, the response rate to ownership questions in our survey is quite high: more than three quarters of 
firms provide information on their ownership structure. 
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Managers15, on the contrary, increased their stakes since the time of privatization as 
several studies show (see Angelucci et al. 2002, Brown et al.2003). According to a survey 
of 1000 medium and large Russian industrial enterprises carried out in 2002, managers 
hold on average 19 % of shares (see Guriev et al.). In our survey this figure is lower but 
still quite high – 13.5 %. 
 
There is also growing evidence in favor of increasing ownership concentration in the 
hands of outsiders, mostly through buying out dispersed shareholders. According to 
Angelucci et al., by the year 2000 outsiders doubled their share to 32 %. Guriev et al. find 
that the stake held by the largest outside shareholder in their sample is about 24 %. In our 
sample Russian and foreign firms hold on average almost 32 % of shares. Some 
individuals from the “other persons” category can also be large shareholders. 
 
Thus, our findings are in line with the observed tendency for decreasing ownership by 
workers and the state and for the growing importance of outside blockholders, which has 
its implications for corporate governance of Russian firms.  
 
Size and performance dynamics 
The survey asked information on several indicators, including number of employees and 
performance figures, for the five years from 1998 to 2002. Table 3.6 shows that the 
average size of the firms in the sample was slightly increasing during 1998 – 2000, and 
then it started to decrease. The average firm in the sample had 1658 employees in 2002. 
 
                                                 
15 We also collected information about the seniority of managers. An average general manager has been 
working in the firm for 8 years. 
Lastly, similar to many previous surveys, the sample contains some degree of selection 
bias towards the better-performing firms. The share of loss-making firms was decreasing 
in 1998-2000 and then increased significantly so that in 2002 it was above the 1998 level 
(see Table 3.7) by both measures of the share of loss-making firms that can be calculated 
from the sample. Still, for all the years the share of loss-making enterprises in our sample 
is below the figure reported by Goskomstat for industrial enterprises, which was as high 
as almost 40 % in recent years. 
 
4. Firms and the provision of social services in Russia 
 
4.1. Social assets and services: within or outside the firm 
 
The divestment of social assets such as housing and daycare from industrial enterprises to 
the public sector in Russia has been mostly thought as achieved. The attention has mostly 
shifted from the situation in firms to the problems of local and regional governments in 
managing their expenditure mandates. Our survey results, however, show that the large 
industrial firms still provide a wide array of social services or finance them despite having 
divested of them. There are also substantial differences across the interviewed firms and 
different types of assets in how fast and to what extent divestiture has taken place. 
Furthermore, many of the firms have no intention of divesting all their assets; rather, they 
intend to invest in the package of fringe benefits they provide to their employees (and in 
many cases also to users outside the firm). 
 
Over 90 % of the surveyed firms had at least some kind of social assets in 1990, and over 
90 % still provided or supported at least one service in 2003, though the scale of the 
firms’ participation in social service provision has diminished significantly during the last 
decade. In this section, we describe the main findings on social assets. 
 
4.2. Provision of social services in 1990-2003 
 
Housing  
In 1990, 78.5 % of the 404 surveyed firms provided housing to their employees (see 
Table 4.1). Of those that did, close to 60 % have since then fully divested of housing, and 
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almost all have divested either fully or partly.16 In most cases, divestment has occurred to 
the municipality, but among more than 20 % of the firms that owned housing in 1990, 
apartments have been sold to other parties, at least partially. In the spring of 2003, over 
half of the surveyed social managers reported that their respective firms still owned 
housing or provided housing support in some other form, mostly through direct subsidies. 
It is also striking that in over a half of the firms that offer this benefit, users are not just 
employees and their families. Over 60 % of the firms reported that the people living in the 
apartments cover some part of the costs. Surprisingly, many firms, 15.1 %, had assets that 
were built after 1990.17 
 
Medical care18 
Almost 80 % of firms provided medical care in 1990. However, only slightly more than 
20 % have divested of it fully, and over 90 % continued providing support for medical 
services in some form in 2003. Two thirds of all surveyed companies still own these 
assets, mostly in the form of having a so-called medpunkt on site19. Firms allow outsiders 
to use their medical services less frequently than housing services, though the share of 
firms allowing other users is still close to 40 %. Taking into account that, according to the 
law, firms had to divest the medical facilities which were outside the plant area and 
serviced people from the region, this figure is especially high. In very few cases, fees are 
collected for using the service. 
 
Daycare 
Daycare was also provided widely by the firms when the reforms started in the early 
1990’s. Approximately 90 % have divested their kindergartens, almost solely to the 
                                                 
16 Divested fully includes also firms that closed down operations, even if they did not actively divest of 
related assets, e.g. buildings 
17 Answers by social managers (Table 4.1) and general managers (Table 4.2) differ somewhat, as they were 
asked slightly different questions and also have different viewpoints to the firms’ operations. For instance, 
having by general manager may mean both the firm having assets on balance, or still covering the costs of 
assets that used to belong to the firm, although technically already transferred to the municipality. In 
general one can expect that the social manager’s knowledge of details of social services is more reliable, 
whereas the general manager can probably better put these issues into broader perspective. 
18 As in other categories of services, we use a broad definition of medical care, which includes in principle 
all the ways a firm uses funds on medical care, for instance through medical insurance.  
19 A Medpunkt is an on-site medical service, many times simply a room in an administrative building. This 
partially explains the low figures on active divestment of medical assets. Furthermore, for medical care, 
only approximately a half of the surveyed firms that have medical assets according to the general or social 
manager, report balance sheet figures, whereas for housing, daycare and recreation facilities, almost in all 
firms where managers report having it, balance sheet values are also reported. This can be taken as evidence 
that in a half of the firms, medical facility means medpunkt which doesn’t have balance sheet value. 
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municipality. The firms that did divest gave up on average close to 90 % of their daycare 
capacity (see Table 4.4). Only a few have built any new facilities since 1990, and only 
one fourth provided support for daycare in any form in 2003, the service thus losing 
relative importance in the social benefit package the firms offer their employees, in part 
because of demographic changes and a lower demand for the service.  
 
Recreation facilities 
Less than 40 % of the firms had recreation facilities in 1990. Over half of those have 
divested of their assets completely, and just a few have invested in new ones. In 2003, 
however, over 70 % still supported their employees’ leisure activities in one way or 
another, mostly giving out direct subsidies for travel. As is understandable due to the 
nature of this support, users or recipients are generally just the employees and their 
families, not outsiders. 
 
Other social assets 
Other social assets include, for instance, lunch cafeterias, sports or cultural facilities and 
pioneer camps for children, but even schools and hotels were mentioned by the firms. 
Over 80 % of the firms had at least some of these assets in 1990, and over 75 % still had 
them in 2003. Close to 20 % of the firms have built new assets since 1990. In 2003, 64 % 
of the firms had a cafeteria, which is a slight decrease from 76 % in 1990. Approximately 
one third of the firms that had sports facilities have since stopped operating them, and 
currently 25 % of these 404 firms have sports facilities. Lastly, 18 % still operate pioneer 
camps, and 16 % operate cultural facilities, which is less than a half of the firms that 
engaged in these activities in 1990.  
 
4.3. Trends in social assets and service provision 
 
Divestment 
Both the scale and timing of divestment differ significantly by type of asset. Figure 4.1 
describes the annual number of firms that carried out their last divestment of certain 
assets between 1990 and 2003. Interestingly, housing divestiture seems to have continued 
more evenly until 2003 than daycare divestiture, which had a clear peak in the mid 
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1990’s.20 As mentioned above, only a few firms have divested of medical facilities in 
general.  
 
The average firm has divested of 75 % of its housing and 86 % of its daycare (see Table 
4.4). For both housing and daycare, almost 90 % of firms report having divested fully or 
partially, but only about 60 compared to about 90 % report full divestiture of housing and 
daycare, respectively. 
 
When asked about the main reasons for the divestments that took place during the last 
three years (see Table 4.3), a clear majority of the general managers said that the assets 
were an excessive burden to the firm. Only a handful had the opportunity to sell the assets 
profitably, whereas many – about one third for housing, medical care, and daycare- had 
just been waiting for the time when the municipality would finally accept the assets. 
 
From Figure 4.2 it is seen that larger firms, measured by employment, are more likely to 
have social assets left, especially for recreation assets. Also, with the exception of 
recreation, the general managers of the larger firms are less eager to divest of their current 
social assets than the managers of firms with fewer than 500 employees (Figure 4.3). 
 
Forms of current provision 
In 1990 most firms had at least housing, medical care, and daycare facilities within the 
firm. The situation is similar in 2003 only in medical care. Direct subsidies to employees 
and their families have become more important, especially in supporting leisure activities. 
In housing, not only offering direct subsidies, but also providing loans or guaranteeing 
them for the employees have become relatively common. Of the firms that still have 
assets on the balance sheet (see Table 4.1), most seem to employ rather significant 
numbers of workers in these services (see Table 4.5). 
 
Many of the users of the services come from outside the firms, which could mean two 
things: the firms are either forced to provide certain service in a community, where no 
other party does so, or they are simply selling the service. The share of users other than 
employees in an average firm that allows outsider-use is around 40 % for housing, 
                                                 
20 Faster divestment of housing relative to daycare can be due to the fact that the share of expenses covered 
by user fees is typically higher in housing than in daycare. 
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daycare, and recreation facilities, and approximately 20 % for medical care (see Table 
4.4). 
 
In a great number of firms the users pay fees for the services.21 Hence, the firms are 
moving towards semi-public provision, or more market-oriented ways of providing the 
services, both paying for their employees to use outside services and selling their services 
to outsiders as well. However, up to date, the magnitude of these fees remains low 
compared to the total costs of service provision. For the firms that report any costs in 
2002, the current costs of housing are especially high relative to the wage bill (see 
Appendix 4). 
 
Larger firms have higher social service costs relative to the wage bill (Figure 4.4),22  and 
they are less likely to have completely divested of their social assets (Figure 4.5). 
Furthermore, the firms that had assets built after 1990 were approximately twice as large, 
measured by employment, as those that did not have new assets. Thus, as was the case 
with divestment details, the pattern of current provision also seems to indicate a more 
active role in social assets provision with larger firms. The forestry industry stands out 
from the other industries in building new social assets. 
 
Relations to municipality 
Less than 10 % of the social managers reported that the firm financially supported 
municipal services that had previously belonged to the firm, whereas between 10 and 20 
% of the general managers reported that their firm spent money on municipality-run 
assets in 2002 (see Tables 1 and 2). Also, according to the accounting figures, 8.7 % of 
firms reported that they provided financial support for housing that had already been 
transferred to the municipality, and for those firms these costs in 2002 were comparable 
to the costs of running their own housing (see Appendix 4). In general, the costs of 
supporting municipal assets are high compared to the costs of direct subsidies for 
housing, medical care, and daycare. 
 
                                                 
21 In principle the fees are regulated by local authorities, although there is a lot of variation in the tariff 
levels. 
22 According to the accounting figures, 92 percent of the firms report some costs of housing, medical care, 
daycare or recreation and for those firms the average total costs of these services amount to 8.4 percent of 
wage bill with the median firm spending 2.4 percent in 2002 (see Appendix 4). 
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For all assets, the managers thought it was more likely that the tax burden would decrease 
rather than increase should they divest of their assets, irrespective of whether they would 
transfer them to the municipality or sell them to some other party. This is in principle 
contrary to the expectation that providing the services would be seen as a favor to the 
administration, leading to a smaller tax burden of the firm, but the reported reduction in 
tax burden may be just due to decreases in property and land taxes. As to relations with 
the municipality other than taxation, the managers see generally no change as a result of a 
transfer, but many think the relations would worsen should the firm sell the assets (see 
Table 4.2). Municipalities can have many ways to put pressure on firms, e.g. by requiring 
firms to provide services and pay back through purchases of firms' products at prices 
above the market price. Therefore, informal agreements between firms and municipalities 
in service provision seem likely. 
 
Social vision of the firm- is there one? 
Of the firms which provided certain services in 2003, less than 5 % of general managers 
per asset deemed them profitable. The majority of those that had housing left wanted to 
divest of it, and approximately a half of those few that still provided daycare wanted to 
divest of that asset as well. More than one third of those who would like to divest their 
housing and daycare faced legal or administrative barriers to selling them. Interestingly, 
the groups of firms that, on the one hand wanted to divest of their assets, and, on the other 
hand, faced legal or administrative barriers to selling them, did not completely overlap, 
meaning that a relatively large number of firms faced other barriers to divestment. 
 
Firms seem to provide medical care, recreation facilities, and some other assets 
voluntarily. Over 40 % of the firms have invested in medical care during the last three 
years (see Table 4.3), whereas only 2 % have divested these assets. For daycare, the 
results are opposite; for housing, almost as many firms report investment as divestment. 
 
Social services, and in general non-monetary payments, may be important for attaching 
workers to a particular firm. Indeed, among approximately half of the surveyed firms, at 
least some workers would quit if the firm stopped providing social services, especially in 
the firms with the highest social costs as a percentage of the wage bill. Relative to their 
wage bill, social service provision seems more important to the less-educated part of the 
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workforce, particularly for the skilled blue-collar workers who comprise on average more 
than 60 % of the labor force (Figures 4.6 and 4.7). 
 
In addition to the generally extensive social service provision, more than 40 % of the 
firms have also considerably more employees than they deem efficient, indicating that 
labor hoarding is still an important phenomenon. Moreover (Figure 4.8), the firms that 
have an optimal employment level reported less often that a large proportion of their 
workers would quit if the firm stopped providing social services.  At the same time, both 
firms that reported a shortage of labor (optimal level more than 100 % of the current 
level) and those that reported labor hoarding more often tried to attach their workers to 
the firm through social services provision.  
 
In conclusion, the social conscience of the firms, if any, seems at least partially forced or 
mandated by relations to the municipality. Also, the firms seem increasingly willing to 
attach their workers through providing part of the compensation package in the form of 
fringe benefits instead of only monetary salaries. 
 
 5. Firms and infrastructure 
 
The aim of questions regarding firms’ infrastructure is to determine whether firms mainly 
rely on outside or within-the-firm sources for their basic infrastructure needs. By basic 
infrastructure we mean the items every (Russian) industrial enterprise necessarily needs, 
irrespective of its industrial branch or geographical location. First and foremost are 
electricity and heat, but natural gas, water and sanitation, transportation networks, and 
other items usually provided directly by the public sector or by state-owned companies 
are significant and/or important.  
 
A well-functioning public sector is a necessary condition for economic and social well 
being. This survey reveals how Russian industrial enterprises assess the quality of public 
infrastructure and to what extent they supplement it by their own production.  
 
5.1. Heating 
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Russia’s climatic conditions are generally very harsh, and a well-functioning heating 
system is necessary not only for convenience reasons, but also simply for ensuring that 
enterprises’ buildings and machinery remain operational. In Russia, heating is mainly 
based on central district heating. A local energy company often provides not only 
electricity, but also heating, i.e. warm water, to its customers. The heating networks – 
warm water pipelines – which Russia inherited from Soviet times, are generally in need 
of urgent repair, and thus news about disruptions in heat delivery to households are 
frequent.  
 
Three quarters of the surveyed firms produce heat, and the majority of them cover all 
their own needs. Being self-sufficient in terms of heating does not seem to be more 
prevalent among larger firms; between 70 and 80 % of firms in all size categories produce 
their own heat. Regional and industrial variation in heat production is somewhat larger. 
Firms in the Urals and in the Siberian federal districts are less likely to have their own 
boilers than firms located in the Southern and North-Western federal districts. Two thirds 
of the enterprises in light industry, machinery, and chemical industries run their own 
boilers, while in other industrial branches over 80 % of firms produce their own heat (see 
Tables 5.1-5.3).    
 
Over half of the 300 firms that produce heat also sell it to outside users, mainly to local 
housing entities and other firms in the same city.  However, it seems that the reasons for 
producing and selling heat have less to do with low-quality provision by the local energo 
or with current market conditions than with Soviet inheritance. The majority of general 
managers we interviewed said that their firm produces heat due to traditions or due to 
technological needs, which could be exactly the same thing. Roughly one third of the 
firms that sell heat do so for commercial reasons (i.e. it brings profit to the firm). For 
most of the firms the main reasons were either traditions or social responsibility as the 
enterprise may be the sole provider of heat for its neighborhood.  
 
Mainly due to this self-sustaining production, interruptions in heat delivery in 2002 had 
occurred only at 10% of the interviewed firms and they were on average not considered to 
be a significant obstacle for firm operations (Table 5.5). Where interruptions in heat 
delivery occurred, they lasted on average for 13 days. It seems, however, that long 
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interruptions are concentrated in a small number of enterprises. The median length of all 
interruptions in heat delivery during the year 2002 was one week.  
 
Thus, it seems that large industrial firms are rather self-sufficient when it comes to 
heating, and there is no clear indication of this being only a temporary phenomenon. The 
number of general managers wishing to get rid of their heating boilers (43) is smaller than 
the number of enterprises that have acquired their own heating systems only after 1990 
(52). Further, a remarkable amount of the respondents (17% of total) said they give some 
form of support for the upkeep of local heating networks outside their plant area. Several 
large enterprises continue providing heat to their neighborhood even though it does not 
bring them any profit. The reason clearly is that the district heating systems were built 
around the local large plants, and the firms can not afford to let their village freeze.  
 
Contrary to some earlier beliefs, providing heat to local users outside the plant area does 
not seem to go hand in hand with favorable local tax treatment. The share of managers 
who believed that their tax burden would decrease if they were to sell their boilers is 
significantly larger than of those who anticipated an increased tax payment. The main 
finding here, however, is that producing heat (whether selling it to outsiders or not) is 
perceived by firm managers to influence a firm’s tax burden. Less than 60 % of the 
managers think their tax burden would remain unchanged in the case of a sale or a 
transfer of their heating boilers (see Table 5.4).   
 
5.2. Electricity 
 
Only a handful of the enterprises (10%) have the capacity, to varying extents, to generate 
their own electricity. It seems that most of the generators are solely for emergency cases, 
as only 19 firms produced electricity in 2002. Further, only two general managers 
claimed the reason for generating their own electricity was for a non-technical reason. In 
those two cases, the reason was that the local provider’s price was too high. On average, 
the price of electricity varies greatly within and across regions but much less so across 
different industries. The mean price of electricity in the Far East is about 70% higher than 
in the Siberian federal district. 
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Well above one third of the firms had experienced interruptions in electricity delivery in 
2002, and a half of those forms considered that the interruptions had a significant impact 
on their operations (Table 5.5). As with heating delivery, long interruptions seem to be 
concentrated among relatively few firms. On average, power outages lasted six days in 
2002, but the median of all 151 observations is only two days. The chief engineers 
estimated that the losses due to interruptions in electricity delivery were extremely small. 
The median estimate is 0.1 % of total production in 2002.   
 
These results lead to several possible conclusions. First, it is clear that during Soviet times 
only very few industrial enterprises produced electricity since it was the task of separate 
companies. Consequently, there is very little inherited electricity-generating capacity 
among Russian industrial firms. Second, our findings may mean that the existing 
electricity generation and distribution system works so well that the firms do not need to 
consider alternatives. Third, one must remember that we still do not know about the 
connections between large enterprises and local energy companies. Large enterprises may 
be not only large customers, but also significant owners in some local energy companies.  
 
5.3. Other items of infrastructure 
 
Some questions on a wider range of infrastructure services the firms generally use were 
also asked. As expected, almost all of the firms use electricity, post, roads, rails, garbage 
collection, natural gas, and water supplies provided from outside the firm. Less than half 
are dependent on public provision of heating and security (see Table 5.6).  
 
On average, only the quality of roads was deemed rather poor, while everything else was 
rated between good and satisfactory. Given that people usually tend to give answers such 
as “normal”, “satisfactory”, and “medium” when asked these types of questions, it seems 
that chief engineers of large industrial enterprises are surprisingly satisfied with the 
quality of these services. One needs to remember, however, that quality is not an absolute 
measure; rather it is always assessed in relation to something else (past experience, a 
competing product, etc). Consequently, we may conclude that on average the Russian 
industrial enterprises we surveyed consider the quality of the services listed in Table 5.6 – 
apart from roads – as being good or satisfactory, and in general not worse than three years 
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ago. Russian firms do not seem to consider the quality of infrastructure as any major 
hindrance to their operations.  
 
A distinctive feature from most OECD countries is that many firms contribute directly to 
the construction and maintenance of public infrastructure. In all, 43% of the surveyed 
enterprises provide some form of support to one or several types of public infrastructure 
listed in table 5.7. Most often support is given to roads, but it is also given to municipal 
heating and water networks, as well as to municipal waste collection, which receives 
considerable support. 
 
Since, on average, more than 60% of the firms’ transportation needs are covered by road 
transportation and only about 37% of their needs are covered by railroads, the perceived 
low quality of roads may be an indication that transportation is somewhat problematic for 
large firms. The fact that 24% of enterprises contribute voluntarily (i.e. in addition to road 
taxes and fees) to the maintenance and construction of roads outside their production 
facilities adds support to this view. 
 
Given the huge distances and inherited industrial geography in Russia, transporting both 
inputs and outputs is a vital issue for large enterprises. Firms typically own tens of trucks, 
lorries, buses, and other vehicles to satisfy their transportation needs. A large number of 
firms also own railroads. Over 40% of the respondents said that their firm has its own 
railroads, with 49 firms owning over 10 km of rails. Every sixth firm has its own railway 
cars, but only a few own a notable amount (i.e. over 10 cars). As one would expect, the 
average size of a firm that owns rail cars or railroads is significantly larger than the 
average of the sample. 
 
6. Firms and regulatory environment 
 
6.1. Overall summary statistics 
The first thing to note about the regulatory environment in which firms that have public 
infrastructure or social assets are operating is that a fair number of firms have legal or 
administrative restrictions on divestiture of these assets (Table 5.1.).  The most common 
regulatory obstacles are created for divestiture of housing and daycare: 33.6% and 34% of 
firms could not sell their housing and daycare, respectively, to a third party (that is not a 
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part of the municipal government). Constraints are least frequent for selling recreational 
facilities but they are nonetheless quite common: 20% of firms face them. 
 
Among many of the surveyed firms, regulatory agencies occupy a significant amount of 
top management’s working time (Table 6.2.). Directors of over 50% of the companies 
spend more than two weeks per year dealing with authorities on questions of public 
infrastructure. Directors in about one third of the companies spend more than two weeks 
per year dealing with each of the following agencies: licensing, certification, and 
customs. The head engineer spends more than two weeks per year dealing with fire 
inspections and SES in 30 and 26% of the firms, respectively. The personnel manager 
allocates more than two weeks of his/her time to labor-regulating agencies in almost half 
of the companies. Interestingly, the time spent by management with licensing, 
certification, customs, fire inspections, and SES inspections is significantly (at 5% 
significance) correlated across firms. Time spent on questions about public infrastructure 
is significantly correlated with time spent with labor regulating agencies. Thus, if a firm is 
facing a predatory regulatory environment along one of these dimensions, then the firm is 
likely to face a similar environment along other dimensions as well. There is a lot of 
variation in regulatory environments across firms: in 6% of the firms, management 
spends three days or fewer per year communicating with authorities on each of these 
problems. 
 
The top managers of 173 firms also offered estimates in answer to a question regarding 
the level of bribes in companies such as theirs (Tables 6.3. and 6.4.). On average 0.8% of 
revenues was reported to be spent on bribes. The median among the firms that answered 
is 0. The manager refused to answer this question in 27% of the firms. Among those who 
answered the question, the distribution of answers is very wide (table 4R):  60% of the 
firms reported that there are no bribes; 27% admitted that bribes exist but are below 1%; 
12% said that the bribe level is between 1 and 5% of revenues (which is a very substantial 
sum for the large companies that constitute our sample). 
 
Almost half of the firms in our sample were awarded tax extensions during the three years 
preceding the survey (Table 6.5). A much smaller numbers got subsidized loans, tax 
breaks, or direct subsidies (8, 16, and 5%, respectively). Interestingly, almost 70% of top 
managers said that they did not know of any cases in which enterprises in their regions 
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received unfair competitive advantages due to tax breaks given by the regional or local 
governments. There is a significant positive correlation between receiving tax breaks and 
direct subsidies. Thus, the few firms that get direct government support in our sample are 
likely to get it in different forms. 
 
Roughly 5 to 10% of firms admitted that there is high incidence of capture of power by 
firms at each level of government (Table 6.6). Ten, eight, and six % of the firms thought 
of themselves as being very influential in drafting laws and regulations on the local, 
regional, and federal levels, respectively. Twelve, fourteen, and twenty-one % of the 
firms responded that their competitors are very influential in drafting laws and regulations 
that affect their own business at the local, regional, and federal levels of government, 
respectively. About 4% of the firms felt that unions are very influential. The firms that 
call themselves influential at one of the government levels are both very likely to think 
that they are influential on other levels of government and to think that (although 
significantly less so) their competitors are also influential. 
 
 
6.2. Size and regulatory environment 
 
The comparison of the median time costs by size category shows that, along all of the 
dimensions, the largest size category has the largest time costs of dealing with authorities 
(Table 6.7.). 
 
Divestiture of public infrastructure and social assets is also correlated with size: it is 
harder for large companies to sell day care centers, but easier to dispose of housing 
(Figure 6.1.). 
 
In our sample, actual  special treatment received by firms from the government is not 
significantly correlated with size (except for the fact that the incidence of tax delays and 
tax breaks in the largest size category is substantially higher than in enterprises from all 
other size groups) (Figure 6.2). Larger companies, however, have a lower probability of 
perceiving that other firms receive special treatment. 
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In our sample, as one would expect, size matters a great deal for firms’ actual engagement 
in capture, as well as for their perceptions about whether or not other firms have an 
influence on the institutional environment, particularly at the municipal and regional 
levels. Figures 6.3., 6.4, and 6.5. illustrate the percentages of firms that have a large 
influence on municipal, regional, and federal institutions, respectively. 
 
6.3. Regional variation and regulatory environment  
 
In addition, again as expected, the regulatory environment varies across regions and 
federal districts. In particular, the extent to which the Far East is over-regulated is 
striking, as shown in Table 6.8. Far-Eastern enterprise managers have to spend the most 
time negotiating with authorities (Table presents median values). 
 
Regulations of divestiture of social assets and public infrastructure (Figure 6.6.) also vary 
significantly across federal districts. For example, about 60% of the firms in the Far East 
face obstacles to selling housing to a third party, whereas this share is about 10% in the 
Southern district. As shown in Figure 6.7, the extent of the government’s paternalism 
towards firms in our sample also differs from one federal district to another. Figures 6.8. - 
6.10 show the variation in capture across federal districts. The perception of capture at all 
levels of government seems to be the highest for the Far Eastern enterprises. 
 
7. Performance, investment, finance, competition, and the relation to 
housing and heating 
 
This section provides information on firm performance and investment. It also reports 
findings on finance, competition, direction of sales (as exports and to the public sector), 
and barter. At the end of this section, we describe how these background factors are 
related to housing and heating.  
 
7.1. Sales and profits 
 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 report average median sales and average profit figures, respectively, 
from 1998-2002. Among the sampled firms, sales have risen since 1998, but there was a 
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significant drop in sales from 2000 to 2001. Profits (earnings before interest payments 
and taxes) have followed a similar pattern. This somewhat surprising finding is 
corroborated by information on the number of profitable and loss-making firms. The 
share of firms reporting profits was highest in 2000 (90%); it dropped to 76% in 2002, 
which is lower than the 1998 figure, 79%.  
 
There are no remarkable differences in the number of profitable firms in 2002 across 
Federal Districts. Medium-sized firms from the sample are only slightly more often 
profitable than the others. 
 
There is some variation in profitability over industries in 2002 (see Figure 7.1). 
Strikingly, all firms in the power and fuel industries are loss- firms making, and firms in 
light industry are usually loss-making as well. All firms in the other categories are 
profitable. 
 
One of the reasons for low profitability may be that the firms’ capital stock is quite old 
(Table 7.6.), on average, one quarter of the machinery is less than ten years old. If old 
firms that have not been restructured properly are overrepresented then their position may 
have been weakened during the recent economic upswing. 
 
7.2. Investment and finance 
 
Investments in fixed capital (see Table 7.3) have increased since 1998, but, as with sales, 
there was a drop from 2000 to 2001.  
 
Investments are still financed mainly through retained profits (Table 7.4). On average 
77.5% of investments are financed through firms’ own funds and 16.5% through bank 
loans. The role of other financing forms is minor. Note that a median firm only uses 
retained profits as a source of funds. However, the number of firms that do not use bank 
loans at all has moderately declined from 224 in 2000 to 213 in 2002. 
 
The share of bank loans is slightly higher for small firms (19% in firms employing fewer 
than 500 workers as opposed to 11% for firms employing more than 1,500 but fewer than 
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5,000 workers). The share of bank loans is higher than average for iron and steel, 
machinery and metalworking, forestry, pulp and paper, construction, and light industries.  
 
7.3. Liquidity 
 
When asked about access to credit, 18% of firms said that they have not applied for 
credit, 77% have applied and received credit, and 5% have applied but not received credit.  
 
Out of the 74 firms that have not applied for credit, 34 said that they have not done so 
because they have sufficient internal funds. High interest rates as a reason for not to apply 
for credit was mentioned 37 times. The companies that did not received credit even 
though they applied for it reported that they did not receive credit due to high collateral 
requirements (7 answers) and other various reasons (9 answers). 
 
Large firms receive credit more often. Firms in machinery and metalworking, as well as 
firms in forestry and pulp and paper have less often than average received credit. There is 
some variation over Federal Districts as well: firms in the South, the Volga region, and 
the Far East receive credit less often. 
 
The average interest rate paid is 20.2%, while the median is 20% and the maximum 39%. 
The median length of a loan is only 12 months, while the maximum length is 10 years. 
There are no regional, industry or size differences in these figures.  
 
In sum, based on access to credit, firms are relatively little credit constrained. Given the 
inflation (15% in 2002), the real interest rates for bank loans appear to be tolerable as 
well. However, loans are very short term, and their role in investment finance is still 
small. 
 
7.4. Direction of sales 
 
On average, firms export around 16% of their production, and 21% of the sales go to the 
public sector (Figure 7.2). Larger firms export a higher share of their production, though 
there is no clear relation between firm size and sales to the public sector.  Forestry, pulp 
and paper, power and steel, and iron and steel sectors are the most open industries, while 
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in the construction and food processing sectors, the export share is the smallest (Figure 
7.3). Firms in the North-Western and Far East Federal Districts are relatively more export 
oriented (Figure 7.4). 
 
7.5. Competition 
 
The average share the firms have of the regional market is 43% (median 30%, maximum 
100%). On the national market, the average share is 29% (median 20%, maximum 
100%). The market shares are quite large.  
 
There is very little variation in the regional market shares; the smallest and surprisingly 
the largest firms have the smallest share of national markets. On the other hand, there is 
much more industrial variation in the market share (Figure 7.5). Firms in the power and 
fuel, construction materials, and food-processing sectors report to have the smallest share 
of the national market. In the North-West and Siberia, the regional share is much smaller 
than elsewhere. Far Eastern firms have the lowest share (15%) on average of national 
markets, while Central area firms have the highest (33%). 
 
The median number of competitors in the firms’ main markets (as defined by the firms 
themselves) is 10 (mean 33, maximum 500). Larger firms have slightly fewer competitors 
(the median number is 8 for firms employing more than 5,000 workers). In forestry, the 
median number of competitors is the highest (50), while it is smallest (6) in the iron and 
steel sector and in the machinery and metal work sector. 
 
Half of the firms reported that they face severe import competition. Only one third of the 
firms employing more than 5,000 workers faces severe import competition. Seventy % of 
the firms in light industry and other industries face serious competition, while only 33% 
of the firms in construction materials face it. Import competition is highest in North-West 
and the mildest in Siberia. 
 
As one can notice from Figure 7.6, 50% of the firms reported that their sales would drop 
by more than 10% following a market price increase of 10%. Interestingly, 14% of firms 
believed that sales would not drop at all. This no doubt raises the question of why they do 
not increase their prices, which is perhaps due to administrative price controls. The 
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demand seems to be the most elastic in light industry and the least elastic in iron and steel 
production. Larger firms face the least elastic demand: only 30% of firms employing 
more than 5,000 workers reported that demand would drop by more than 10%, and 20% 
of such firms said that demand would not change. Of the Federal Districts, the demand is 
reported to be the least elastic in the Volga region (38% of the firms said that demand 
would drop by more than 10%). 
 
7.6. Barter 
 
Since its peak prior to the currency crises in 1998, the share of barter transactions in 
Russian firms has fallen dramatically. Based on the information in our sample (Table 
7.5), the median firm does not trade in barter at all. The Russian form of barter includes 
not only goods-for-goods trade, but also the use of promissory notes (veksels) and offsets. 
Even taking this into account, the picture does not change much. On average, 83% of 
payments are handled either by cash or bank payments. The share of barter transactions 
(goods-for-goods) with the public sector and the private sector is on average 1.2% and 
1.8%, respectively. 
 
Small firms trade more in barter with the private sector (mean = 3% if fewer than 500 
workers). The use of non-traditional forms of payments is more frequent in the power and 
fuel sector. Veksels are more often in use in the Volga region and Siberia, and offsets are 
used much more often in Siberia (mean = 15) and the Far East (mean = 22). Barter with 
the private sector is less common in the North-West (0.4), as is barter with the public 
sector (0.6). 
 
7.7. Interactions with housing and heating 
 
The purpose of gathering data on issues reported in this section is not the information per 
se, but rather the relation of the information to public sector delivery, social services, and 
infrastructure provision. Data on competition, finance, barter, etc. are also needed as 
additional variables in investment and profitability regressions.  
 
This section takes first steps in exploring the interactions among these factors, social 
services, and infrastructure provision. As examples of these factors, we examine housing 
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(its provision by firms and investment in it) and heating (to what extent firms financially 
support municipal heating).  
 
The findings are based on simple cross tabulations, where no additional potential 
determinants can be taken into account. Therefore, the correlations must be seen as ideas 
for further analysis through more sophisticated techniques (regression analysis) that will 
be presented in future papers. 
 
Based on the data, the following findings emerged: 
 
• Foreign-owned firms more often provide housing (43% vs. insider-owned 38%), and 
they also invest in housing more often (37% vs. insider-owned 31%).23  
• Publicly-owned firms support municipal heating more often than privately-owned 
firms (17% vs. 10% by insider-owned). Foreign-owned firms also support heating 
slightly less often than do privately-owned domestic firms. 
• Firms that trade more with the public sector own more housing and tend to invest 
more in municipal heating.  
• Firms that export relatively larger shares of their production own housing and invest 
in housing and heating more often than do other firms. On average, these firms tend to 
be large. 
• Firms that do not provide housing receive credit for somewhat smaller interest rates. 
Firms that have applied for but did not obtain credit have less often than others 
divested their housing, while they have provided financial assistance to heating more 
often.  
• The effect of competition is not clear cut: on the one hand, the more elastic the 
demand, the more firms invest in housing.  Further, the more the firms face import 
competition, the more housing stock they own. On the other hand, the more elastic the 
demand, the less firms support heating in the local area. 
• There is no remarkable difference between provision of, investment in, and 
divestment of housing with barter. 
• Loss-making firms provide housing less often (32% vs. 43%) than profitable firms, 
and loss-making firms have divested of housing more often (35 vs. 29%). 
                                                 
23 Foreign-owned firms may provide these services for their foreign workers. 
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• There is a very slight relationship between the aggregate number of days spent 
dealing with public administration and housing and heating. The only correlation is 
that if firms support municipal heating, they deal more with administration (14 % 
have more than 30 days of negotiation vs. 9% of those who do not support heating.) 
 
Based on these findings, it is not clear which sorts of firms provide relatively more 
housing and heating. Some correlations (ownership, liquidity) tend to indicate that 
traditional types of firms provide these services more often. On the other hand, firms that 
provide these services do not seem to suffer from it in terms of profit. All this suggests 
that further analysis is necessary. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
The data from our survey clearly shows that firms in Russia are still very active in social 
service provision and in some infrastructure provision. The motives behind provision may 
differ considerably across firms and regions. While it is clear that firms would like to 
divest of some of their social assets, some firms may regard the provision as a means to 
compete for labor, and still some firms seem to use it to improve market power in the 
local labor markets. On balance, it seems that for most of the firms the social assets are 
more a burden than a benefit. Firms’ relationships with local authorities shape also both 
social service provision, as shown by the difficulty of divesting the assets to the 
municipalities, and infrastructure provision, as shown by the support to the public 
infrastructure. Regulatory capture seems also to be a serious problem. In general, firms 
that provide services beyond the average seem to have closer ties to public sector 
authorities than other firms. 
 
The data collected in the survey will be used systematically to study the impact of public 
sector provision on firm performance and investment, as well as the determinants of 
firms’ provision. Our data also makes it possible also to test various hypotheses regarding 
firms’ behavior in local labor markets and regulatory capture in a way that has not been 
possible in earlier studies. 
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Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Divestment years
0,00
5,00
10,00
15,00
20,00
25,00
30,00
35,00
40,00
998 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
N
o 
of
 fi
rm
s 
th
at
 d
iv
es
te
d
Housing
Medpunkts
Daycare
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. 
Percent of Firms that Have Social Assets, by Firm Size
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Figure4.3.
Percent of firms that want to divest social assets, by firms size
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Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.7. 
Wage increase needed to keep employees if social services stopped (by firm size)
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Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 6.1. 
 
Percentage of firms that have legal obstacles to selling the asset, by size 
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Figure 6.2. 
Government's special treatment, by size category
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Figure 6.3.* 
Municipal-lavel capture by size categories
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* In Figures 6.3.-6.5. the following question has been asked: 
How do you think, up to what extent, do your company or other structures (domestic competitors, foreign 
competitors, labor unions) influence the process of the creation and approval of legal and regulatory acts at 
municipal/ regional/ federal level? (Figures show percent of firms that consider influence to be high) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. 
Regional-level capture by size categories
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Figure 6.5. 
Federal-level capture by size categories
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Figure 6.6. 
Percentage of firms that have legal obstacles to selling the asset, by federal 
district
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Figure 6.7. 
Government's special treatment by Federal Districts
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Figure 6.8.* 
Municipal-level capture (high influence)
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* In Figures 6.3.-6.5. the following question has been asked: 
How do you think, up to what extent, do your company or other structures (domestic competitors, foreign 
competitors, labor unions) influence the process of the creation and approval of legal and regulatory acts at 
municipal/ regional/ federal level? (Figures show percent of firms that consider influence to be high) 
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Figure 6.9. 
Regional level capture (high influence)
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Figure 6.10. 
Federal-level capture (high influence)
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Figure 7.1 
Share of profitable firms by industries, % of all answers
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Figure 7.2  
Mean shares of sales to export and to the public sector, by size
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Figure 7.3  
Mean shares of sales to export and to the public sector, by industry
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Figure 7.4  
Mean shares of sales to export and to the public sector, by 
Federal District
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Figure 7.5 
 
Mean shares of regional and national markets, by industry
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Figure 7.6 
 
Drop in sales following a 10% price increase, % of firms by industries
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Table 3.1. Distribution of Firms by Size (number of employees) in 2000, Based on 
Goskomstat data 
 
 Minimum Mean Median Maximum Number of 
firms 
Sample 
frame 
400 1449.3 749 100005 3523 
Initial sample 400 2485.5 817 100005 399 
Final sample 400 1648.8 784 38980 404 
 
Table 3.2. Origins of Firms 
 
Year of establishing the 
firm 
number of 
firms 
% of firms 
1718 - 1916 75 18.56 
1917 - 1940 95 23.51 
1941-1945 46 11.39 
1946-1989 164 40.59 
1990 - 2002 21 5.20 
Unknown 3 0.74 
Total 404 100 
 
Table 3.3. Organizational Form 
 
Open JSC 289 71.53 
Closed JSC 54 13.37 
Limited liability  company 22 5.45 
Added liability company 1 0.25 
State enterprise 27 6.68 
Municipal enterprise 2 0.5 
Other 9 2.23 
   
Total 404 100 
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Table 3.4. Ownership Categories 
 
Category of ownership number %* 
100% state owned 32 9.38
majority state owned 44 12.90
  
100% privately owned 240 70.38
majority privately owned 297 87.10
  
100% insider owned 37 10.95
majority insider owned 110 32.54
  
100% foreign owned 2 0.59
majority foreign owned 14 4.13
any foreign ownership 44 12.98
*% of those who answered this question 
 
Table 3.5. Ownership Structure 
 
Type of owner Mean ownership stake Median 
ownership stake 
Std. Dev. Number of 
observations 
     
Employees, of which: 36.54 22.25 36.30 338
        Managers 13.53 1.00 23.37 301
        Workers 18.18 6.00 25.41 301
Other persons 13.02 0.00 23.69 337
Russian firms, of which: 26.80 0.00 35.12 339
        State firms 2.04 0.00 11.16 326
        Private firms 23.16 0.00 33.97 327
State, of which: 14.57 0.00 30.46 341
        Federal 7.99 0.00 24.14 329
        Regional 3.01 0.00 12.84 328
        Local 1.42 0.00 10.16 328
Foreign companies 5.11 0.00 17.17 339
Other owners 4.13 0.00 16.73 341
 
Table 3.6. Employment Dynamics 
 
Year Mean Median Number of 
observations
    
1998 1764.93 856 299
1999 1780.41 871 301
2000 1790.31 830 305
2001 1736.46 816 310
2002 1657.68 793 318
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Table 3.7. Share of Loss-Making Firms, as Compared to the Population 
 
Year Share 
of loss-
making 
firms*, 
% 
Number 
of obs. 
Share 
of loss-
making 
firms**, 
%
Number 
of obs. 
Share of 
loss-making 
firms by 
Goskomstat, 
%
1998 20.8 283 27.8 270 48,8
1999 11.2 312 16.1 304 39,1
2000 9.8 328 18.5 313 39,7
2001 19.0 343 26.0 327 39,3
2002 24.5 347 33.1 335 NA
 
*loss from main (production) activity  
**total loss, including non-production activity, interest income etc 
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Table 4.1. Social Asset Provision - Social Manager’s Perspective  
 
How many firms, % of 
total 404 firms surveyed… 
Housing Medical 
care 
Daycare Recreation Other At 
least 
one  
       
Had in 1990 78.5 76.7 69.8 38.2 84.4 94.6 
       
Of those that had:       
% that divested all of 1990 
assets 
57.4 22.6 85.5 54.2 55.4  
% that divested all or part 
of 1990 assets 
90.5 NA 89.7 NA NA  
% that divested all or part 
of 1990 assets to 
municipality 
86.1 12.9 86.2 NA NA  
% that divested all or part 
of 1990 assets to other 
than municipality 
22.4 NA 9.6 NA NA  
       
In 2002, had assets which 
were built after 1990 
15.1 NA 2.0 4.7 17.6 32.4 
       
Have or provide support in 
some form(s) in 2003 
55.7 90.8 26.0 73.3 76.5 97.8 
Have on balance 34.2 67.1 10.4 20.8 76.5 91.8 
Support assets 
transferred to the 
municipality 
5.0 4.0 6.7 0.3 NA 14.1 
Give financial 
assistance directly 
to the employees 
22.0 42.1 8.9 58.7 NA 76.2 
Support otherwise 11.4 8.2 3.0 4.5 NA 22.0 
       
Of those that have or 
support in some form(s): 
      
Users not only employees 
and their families 
55.6 38.7 41.9 29.4 NA 62.3 
Receive payments from 
the users 
61.8 10.1 37.6 57.3 NA 56.9 
 
       
NA = not available 
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Table 4.2. Social Asset Provision - General Manager’s Perspective  
 
How many firms, % of 
total 404 firms surveyed… 
Housing Medical 
care 
Daycare Recreation Other At 
least 
one 
       
Have in 2003 39.5 78.5 11.9 25.9   
Spent money on municipal 
assets in 2002 
11.6 15.4 16.6 5.7 16.3 34.2 
 
       
Of those who have:       
Deem it profitable 1.9 1.3 2.1 4.8   
Want to get rid (sell or 
transfer) 
70.7 12.4 46.8 29.4   
Of those who want to get 
rid of: 
      
Local authorities would 
agree to accept 
42.7 35.9 63.6 40.0   
Have legal or admin. 
barriers to selling 
38.9 35.9 31.8 23.3   
       
In case of transfer to 
municipality: 
      
Tax burden will       
decrease 
not change 
increase* 
19.6 
62.7 
8.9 
10.8 
68.3 
7.0 
16.7 
64.6 
8.3 
18.3 
65.4 
5.8 
  
Relations with 
municipality will 
      
worsen 
not change 
improve 
8.2 
74.7 
7.6 
5.4 
81.0 
2.5 
4.2 
87.5 
4.2 
5.8 
76.0 
6.7 
  
       
In case of sale:       
Tax burden will        
decrease 
not change 
increase 
19.6 
55.7 
6.3 
11.1 
62.5 
6.4 
18.8 
56.3 
6.3 
17.3 
62.5 
3.9 
  
Relations with 
municipality will 
      
worsen 
not change 
improve 
12.03 
66.5 
4.4 
7.3 
75.2 
1.6 
18.8 
70.8 
0.0 
15.4 
71.2 
0.0 
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*the rest is “difficult to say” 
 
Table 4.3 Investment and Divestment of Social Assets during Last 3 Years- General 
Manager’s Perspective 
 
How many firms, % of 
total 404 firms surveyed… 
Housing Medical 
care 
Daycare Recreation Other At 
least 
one 
       
Invested during the last 3 
years 
26.2 43.8 9.9 18.2 24.8 64.1 
       
Reasons for investment       
% of those that invested:       
Build new assets 35.9 0.6 0.0 15.1   
Expand existing service 7.6 24.3 12.5 20.6   
Start providing new 
service 
8.5 9.0 5.0 4.1   
Replace old equipment 21.7 52.5 55.0 42.5   
Other (mainly repair) 26.4 13.6 27.5 17.8   
       
Divested during the last 3 
years 
30.2 2.2 13.6 4.5 7.4 38.4 
       
Reasons for divestment       
% of those that divested:       
Asset was an excessive 
burden for the firm 
50.0 66.7 54.6 72.2   
Had an opportunity to sell 
it profitably 
1.6 0.0 1.8 11.1   
Local or regional 
administration agreed to 
accept it 
33.6 33.3 32.7 16.7   
Other (e.g. privatization to 
workers) 
14.8 0.0 10.9 0.0   
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Table 4.4 Social Asset Provision – Capacities 
 
On average per firm that reported: Asset/ service 
Capacity in 
1990  
 
1990 capacity 
divested 
 
Capacity in 
2002 
 
Of the total number of users in 
2002, other than employees  
Housing 97965 m2  74.7%  11509 m2  41% 
Medical care NA 12.9% NA 21% 
Daycare 576 places  86% 216 places  38% 
Recreation 
facilities 
NA NA NA 37% 
NA= not available 
 
Table 4.5 Employment in Non-production Divisions 
 
  Absolute number of 
employees 
Relative to total employment, 
percentages 
 Percentage 
of firms 
employing  
Mean Conditional 
mean 
Max Mean Conditional 
mean 
Max 
        
Housing 33.4 15.1 44.9 1500 0.6 1.9 31.1 
Medical 
care 
51.7 8.4 11.5 300 0.5 0.6 6.1 
Daycare 12.1 7.8 63.6 450 0.4 3.1 14.0 
Recreation 17.1 6.8 39.5 845 0.2 1.3 8.5 
Catering 
service 
59.9 21.1 34.7 1100 1.0 1.6 8.8 
Children’s 
camps 
13.9 4.5 31.6 232 0.2 1.4 13.3 
Sports 22.8 7.9 33.8 1100 0.1 0.6 7.0 
Culture 14.1 4.9 33.8 380 0.1 0.8 4.0 
Other 16.6 5.9 35.0 504 0.3 1.5 24.5 
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Table 5.1. Infrastructure by Size Categories 
 
Percentage of firms… Number of 
employees producing heat  producing 
electricity  
owning rail 
cars 
supporting 
road 
construction 
supporting 
heating 
networks 
supporting any 
of the infra 
items 
<500 72,9 1.4 11,4 27.1 17.1 44.3 
500-800 67,7 4.6 20,0 17.7 11.5 39.2 
800-1500 78,7 3.7 24,1 21.3 14.8 37.0 
1500-5000 87,8 2.7 43,2 29.7 24.3 50.0 
>5000 80,0 25.0 70,0 45.0 30.0 60.0 
 
Table 5.2. Infrastructure by Federal Districts 
 
Percentage of firms… Federal district 
producing heat  producing electricity   owning rail cars giving support to road 
construction 
Central 75.4 4.2 10.2 16.8 
North West 80.9 10.6 14.9 20.4 
South  91.3 0.0 13.0 38.5 
Volga 75.4 1.6 29.5 25.0 
Urals 71.4 4.8 28.6 36.2 
Siberia 62.5 2.5 20.0 23.5 
Far East 77.8 0.0 11.1 38.5 
Total  75.7 4.5 17.1 24.0 
 
Table 5.3.  Infrastructure by Industries 
Industry percentage of firms 
producing heat 
percentage of firms 
producing electricity  
percentage of firms 
owning rail cars  
percentage of firms 
supporting road 
construction 
Power and fuel 80,0 40,0 100 20.0 
Iron and steel 81,8 22,7 100 45.5 
Chemicals 66,7 3,7 75 37.0 
Machinery 66,7 0,0 37.9 20.6 
Forestry, paper 86,1 11,1 88.9 36.1 
Construction materials 80,0 4,4 66.7 22.2 
Light industry 68,2 0,0 0 11.4 
Food processing 93,3 6,7 37.5 25.0 
Other 54,2 0,0 25 16.7 
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Table 5.4. Heating 
 Boilers 
% of firms that have: 75.74 
Of those who have: 
Provide heat to outsiders 56.23 
Get profit from selling heat 36.9 
Want to get rid of boilers (sell or 
transfer) 
14.14 
Local authorities would agree to 
accept 
33.33 
Have legal or admin. barriers to 
selling 
20.74 
In case of transfer to municipality: 
Tax burden will decrease 
                           Not change 
                           Increase* 
14.52 
56.77 
8.58 
Relations with municipality will 
                           Worsen 
                            Not change 
                            improve 
 
11.18 
61.51 
3.95 
In case of sale:  
Tax burden will decrease 
                           Not change 
                           increase 
12.87 
58.09 
6.6 
Relations with municipality will 
                           Worsen 
                            Not change 
                            improve 
 
11.55 
64.36 
0.33 
 
 
Table 5.5. Interruptions in the Delivery of Basic Infrastructure 
 
 percentage of 
firms that 
experienced 
interruptions in  
Of those: 
percentage of 
firms that 
deem the 
interruptions as 
significant  
Mean / median 
length of 
interruptions, 
days 
electricity  38.61 48.75 7.3 / 2 
water 29.95 32.00 8.1 / 3 
telephone 30.94 39.06 8.6 / 5 
gas 10.5 39.13 18.1 / 3 
heating 10.17 30.43 12.5 / 7 
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Table 5.6. Use and Quality of Outside-provided Infrastructure 
 
 percentage of 
firms that use 
outside provided 
service 
% of firms that 
asses the quality 
as good or 
satisfactory 
% of firms that 
consider the quality 
improved or stayed 
constant 
 
Electricity 98.3 96.7 91.9  
Heat 43.6 90.3 86.4  
Gas 70.3 96.5 90.1  
water 83.2 94.6 92.2  
telephone 95.8 91.9 92.5  
trash collection 60.1 96.3 94.2  
law 
enforcement 
36.7 93.9 93.9  
post 93.6 98.4 95.2  
roads 86.1 67.3 74.1  
railways 78.6 91.7 87.3  
air transport 100 97.22 98.6  
water transport 100 100 91.1  
 
Table 5.7.  Support to Public Infrastructure 
 
 percentage of firms 
that give financial 
support to 
maintenance or 
construction of  
percentage of firms 
that give non-
financial support to 
maintenance or 
construction of 
percentage of firms 
that give either kind 
of support to 
maintenance or 
construction of 
If firm owns, 
percentage of firms 
that give either kind 
of support to 
maintenance or 
construction of 
municipal heating 
system 
10.9 10.2 16.6 18.0 
municipal 
electricity system 
7.7 7.7 11.9 11.1 
local gas network 6.5 4.2 8.4  
municipal water 
network 
10.6 9.4 17.3  
municipal waste 
collection  
10.9 7.7 15.4  
roads outside the 
plant area 
19.9 10.4 24.1  
railroads not owned 
by the firm 
5.5 4.2 7.7 12.2 
 
  
66
66
Table 6.1. 
 
Are there any administrative regulations or legal 
obstacles that prevent you from selling the following 
assets to a private party? 
yes no total # of 
answers 
Boiler? (if has a boiler) 20,88 79,12 297 
Housing? (if has housing) 33,55 66,45 155 
Medical facilities? (if has medical facilities) 24,26 75,74 305 
Daycare? (if has daycare) 34,04 65,96 47 
Recreational facilities (if has them) 19,8 80,2 101 
 
Table 6.2 Working Days Spent by Management in Dealing with Authorities 
 
 obs. mean SD median max % of firms where 
it is 2 weeks or 
more 
Top manager on question about public infrastructure (if 
has it) 
340 17,31 23,69 10 150 51,91 
Top manager with licensing authorities 397 9,05 19,81 2 200 33,5 
Top manager with certification agency 397 8,87 21,88 2 255 30,98 
Top manager with customs 398 9,18 25,48 0 264 26,63 
Head engineer with fire inspectors 398 7,54 16,94 3 200 30,15 
Head engineer with epidemiology (SES) inspection 398 8,07 20,68 3 300 26,88 
Personnel manager with labor regulating agencies  373 14,3 23,75 7 200 44,77 
 
Table 6.3. Bribes as Percent of Revenues 
 
 obs. mean SD min max # do not 
know 
# refuse to 
answer 
estimate for enterprises like yours 173 0,82851 2,24 0 20 163 64 
 
Table 6.4. Distribution of Bribe Estimates 
 
% bribes as a 
share of revenue 
0 0<B<=0.5 0,5 1 1<B<5 5 15 20 
# answers 104 15 8 23 11 10 1 1 
% 60,12 8,67 4,62 13,29 6,36 5,78 0,58 0,58 
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Table 6.5. Government's Special Treatment 
 
 yes no total # of 
answers 
Did you get:    
    Subsidized loans? 8,19 91,81 403 
    Tax breaks? 15,63 84,37 403 
    Tax delays? 48,64 51,36 403 
    Direct subsidies? 5,46 94,54 403 
Do you know of cases when certain enterprises in your 
region receive competitive advantages because of tax 
breaks from local or regional government? 
32,25 67,75 400 
 
Table 6.6 Capture: To what extent the following entities influence laws and regulations that 
affect your enterprise? 
 
 No 
influence
Little 
influence
Lots of 
influence
Not 
relevant 
Do not 
know 
Total 
 % % % % % Obs. 
Municipal level       
Your enterprise 52,4 31,0 9,7  7,0 403 
Your domestic competitors 53,0 19,3 7,9 3,5 16,3 404 
Your foreign competitors 63,9 10,2 4,5 4,5 17,1 404 
Unions 64,5 17,6 4,0  13,9 403 
Regional level       
Your enterprise 61,1 26,7 7,7  4,5 404 
Your domestic competitors 54,0 22,3 7,9 2,0 13,9 404 
Your foreign competitors 61,1 11,9 5,9 3,7 17,3 404 
Unions 66,8 17,6 3,2  12,4 403 
Federal level       
Your enterprise 73,8 14,6 5,9  5,7 404 
Your domestic competitors 49,3 23,5 10,4 1,7 15,1 404 
Your foreign competitors 49,8 17,1 10,4 3,2 19,6 404 
Unions 61,0 20,4 4,5  14,1 403 
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Table 6.7 Medians of Working Days Spent by Management in Dealing with Authorities by 
Size Categories 
 
Number of 
employees 
on questions 
about public 
infrastructure 
licensing 
authorities 
certification 
agency 
customs fire 
inspectors 
epidemiology 
(SES) 
labor 
regulating 
agencies  
<500 12 2,5 3 0 3 2 10 
500-800 9 3 2 0 3 2,5 5 
800-1500 10 2 2,5 2 3 3 7 
1500-5000 5 2,5 2 0 3 3 6,5 
>5000 20 5 5 3 10 6 10 
 
Table 6.8 Medians of Working Days Spent by Management in Dealing with Authorities by 
Federal District 
 
 on questions 
about public 
infrastructure 
licensing 
authorities 
certification 
agency 
customs fire inspectors epidemiology 
(SES) 
labor 
regulating 
agencies  
Central 7 3 3 0,5 3 3 5 
North-
West 
10 5 3 1 3 3 5 
South 7 3 1 0,5 2,5 2 3 
Volga 10 0 0 0 4 5 10 
Urals 10 5 5 0 3 2 3 
Siberia 9 0 2 0 3 2 6 
Far East 30 1 5 0 10 10 36 
 
Table 7.1 Average real1 values of sales and profit in thousand rubles, 1998-2002 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
  
Sales 360223 460273 493505 429882 449303
 
Profit before interest payments and 
taxes* 
44950 76725 67841 59095 54409
Losses before interest payments and 
taxes* 
-27735 -10427 -21781 -18973 -12510
 
Profit/sales, % 13.4 14.6 14.4 19.2 11.1
Loss/sales, % -22.3 -14.9 -15.2 -13.2 -20.3
 
Profits before taxes# 29525 52165 55027 47933 32877
Losses before taxes# -125554 -29226 -34999 -30487 -27495
 
Tax on profit 10127 13956 14772 12868 16422
 
After-tax profit** 22071 36448 35110 30584 20442
After-tax losses** -117854 -29176 -40544 -35317 -27567
 
1 In 2000 values. The deflator is the producer price index, values: 1998:48, 1999:75.2, 
2000:100, 2001:114.8, 2002:132.3. Source: The BEA. 
* income from selling goods and services minus production costs minus overhead costs 
(kommercheskie i upravlencheskie rashody).  
#  the former plus interest received and paid plus non-production income and costs. 
**  the former minus income tax and some emergency (chrezvychainye) income/costs. 
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Table 7.2 
 
Median real1 value of sales and profit in thousand Rubles, 1998-2002 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
  
Sales 127906 140739 156162 136030 154735
 
Profit before interest payments and 
taxes* 
12503 18157 18343 15978 17294
Losses before interest payments and 
taxes* 
-7763 -6063 -5145 -4482 -6333
 
Profit/sales, % 10.3 12.2 10.8 10.2 8.3
Loss/sales, % -12.0 -7.3 -6.8 -6.0 -7.8
 
Profits before taxes# 9604 15460 16939 14755 10066
Losses before taxes# -11535 -5547 -3773 -3287 -6885
 
Tax on profit 1804 3140 3454 3009 1467
 
After-tax profit** 7892 12122 10992 9575 7091
After-tax losses** -13719 -6709 -6615 -5762 -5688
 
1 In 2000 values. The deflator is the producer price index, values: 1998:48, 1999:75.2, 
2000:100, 2001:114.8, 2002:132.3. Source: The BEA. 
* income from selling goods and services minus production costs minus overhead costs 
(kommercheskie i upravlencheskie rashody).  
#  the former plus interest received and paid plus non-production income and costs. 
**  the former minus income tax and some emergency (chrezvychainye) income/costs. 
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Table 7.3 Average real investment, thousand rubles, 1998-2000 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
  
In fixed capital 21685 33227 33493 29175 26128 
In intangible assets 542 465 339 295 151 
In other non-financial assets 54 445 1698 1479 1528 
 
 
Table 7.4 Sources of investment in 2002, % 
 
 Own 
funds 
Bank 
loans 
Public 
funds 
Share 
issue 
Obligatio
ns 
Other 
Nr of firms 
using  
384 191 100 93 90 19 
Mean 77.5 16.5 1.7 0.8 0.4 3.6 
Median 100 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 100 100 100 100 10 100 
 
 
Table 7.5 The proportion of various forms of payments, %.  
 
 Cash Bank 
payments 
Veksels Offsets Barter with 
private 
sector 
Barter with 
public 
sector 
Mean 8.5 74.6 4.3 9.0 1.8 1.2 
Median 1.5 84 0 2 0 0 
Max 100 100 100 100 90 55 
 
Table 7.6. Age of machinery 
 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Less than 5 y 389 10.36548 15.67676 
5-10 y 389 16.11414 19.50531 
10-20 y 389 31.98054 25.82078 
over 20 y 389 41.51671 31.7101 
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Appendix 1. Legal Basis for the Transfer of Social Assets to Municipalities24 
 
In spite of the obvious importance of large scale transfer of social assets kept by 
enterprises under ownership of municipalities, there was never a federal law regulating 
this process. Instead, the reform was regulated by series of legal acts, enactments, decrees 
etc at all levels of government.  Many important acts were introduced with delays, 
sometimes only several years after the start of actual process of transfer, when the most 
acute problems had surfaced. 
 
The formation of municipal ownership over social and infrastructure assets started before 
mass privatization in 1991-1992. Enactment by Higher Council of Russian Federation № 
3020-1 on December 27, 1991 established the division of state ownership into federal 
ownership, ownership of subjects of federation and municipal ownership. This act defined 
the categories of assets which should be transferred into municipal ownership irrespective 
of who owned them or had them on their balance previously. They were: 
 
• housing and other buildings 
• enterprises servicing housing and other social assets 
• infrastructure objects, city transport etc 
 
Another Enactment by President № 114-RP on March 18, 1992 established the 
procedures for the transfer of social and infrastructure assets, according to which 
municipal level property committee compiled the list of objects to be included into 
municipal ownership and higher level government confirmed the list. 
 
As for the social assets held by enterprises, enterprises never owned them during soviet 
time as all assets were state owned, but they kept assets on their balance sheet. With the 
start of mass privatization of the enterprises these assets should have been either 
privatized or transferred to municipality. Presidential Decree № 8 on January 10, 1993 
defined the list of objects which could be included into the list of privatized assets of the 
firm with the requirement of keeping their profile. These included social and cultural 
objects (health, education, culture and sports facilities), consumer services (laundry, 
hairdressers etc.). At the same time Decree defined list of assets that could not be 
privatized by firms: 
 
• Buildings occupied by trading, catering, consumer services establishments, 
organizations of social security for children, elderly and disabled 
• Daycare and summer children’s’ facilities 
• Regional transport and electricity infrastructure 
• Medical facilities servicing population of the city/region 
• Housing and related service facilities 
 
All these assets were defined to be under federal state ownership and should have been 
transferred to municipal ownership. Further, several legal acts of State Property 
Committee were issued to clarify the procedures for transferring the assets listed above 
from firms to municipalities (again, municipalities were responsible for compiling the list 
of objects to be transferred to municipal ownership). The Decree and further acts also 
provided for a possibility for agreements between municipality and a firm about joint 
                                                 
24 Based on the book by Leksin and Shvetsov “New Problems of Russian Cities”, Moscow, 1999 
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usage and financing of transferred assets. There were also other provisions for the ways to 
finance transferred objects. The State Privatization Program introduced at the end of 
1993 did not add anything new to previous legal acts except that it set the time limit: 
municipality was obliged to accept non-privatized social assets during six months after 
the acceptance of firm’s privatization plan. 
 
There were still a lot of ambiguities and poorly defined aspects of reform left. The 
Enactment by the Government of Russian Federation № 235 on March 7, 1995 was 
aimed at clarifying these issues. It extended the list of assets that could not be privatized 
and should be transferred to municipalities (mainly infrastructure objects, such as sewage 
and water supply systems, boilers, heating and electricity networks, servicing divisions of 
infrastructure and social objects etc). At the time when mass privatization was already 
close to an end, the Enactment defined that objects to be transferred to municipality 
should be included into privatization program as a separate list. The adoption of 
privatization plan of a firm then in practice initiated the process of transfer of these assets 
to municipal ownership. 
 
Further problems and questions arising during the process of municipalization of social 
assets were solved through multiple minor acts issued by different government bodies at 
all levels of government and in some cases through courts.   
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Appendix 2 Survey preparation: questionnaire and pilot interviews 
 
The data was gathered in April-June 2003 through structured face-to-face interviews by 
GfK Russia’s regional interviewer network. In each firm, three top managers were 
interviewed: the general manager, a manager responsible for the social sphere of the firm, 
and a manager aware of issues related to infrastructure, mostly chief engineer. In addition, 
the fourth part of the questionnaire was left for the chief accountant for self-completion. 
The issues covered were: 
 
General manager 
• Firm background: ownership, establishment, main line of business 
• Infrastructure and social services 
• Liquidity, finance, investment, divestment 
• Business environment, sales, competition 
Chief engineer 
• Infrastructure 
• Transport 
Social manager 
• Social services 
• Employment 
Chief accountant 
• Costs and balance sheet values of social assets 
• Basic productivity information 
 
Questionnaire preparation started in the end of 2001, based on and with help from teams 
behind several surveys in Russia and elsewhere. As a result, questions in the social and 
infrastructure parts are mostly novel, in other parts we utilized previously tested questions 
to the extent it was possible. 
 
During questionnaire preparation, we first met with several company representatives in 
informal discussions in Novgorod in October 2001 to reach a better focus in our study. 
Next, in February 2002, we held a round table discussion with local businesses and 
administration in Ivanovo. We also met with several Russian specialists to ensure correct 
focus of the survey. 25 
 
In summer 2002, we proceeded to actual pilots in co-operation with the interview 
company VTsIOM. Altogether, three pilots were carried out: 
 
Moscow, June-July 2002 
• 4 firms, in electronics, metallurgy and textile industries 
• Main results: need to shorten the questionnaire and divide it into 4 parts  
                                                 
25 We want to express our gratitude to the Finnish consulate in St Petersburg for the arrangements in 
Novgorod. We also thank Igor N. Zimin from the World Bank Moscow office and Deputy Chairman 
Grigori Oinvid, The Government of Russian Federation Federal Fund for Small Business Support, for 
excellent organization of the round table in Ivanovo. 
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Nizhnyi Novgorod and Vladimir, September 2002 
• 3 firms in Nizhnyi Novgorod, 4 firms in Vladimir, in chemicals, machine 
building, food, textiles, printing and transport industries 
• Main results: social sphere still important within the firms, infrastructure less so, 
all finance and accounting details need to be asked from the accountant 
Moscow, January-February 2003 
• 3 firms, in construction materials, machine building and textile industries 
• Main results: cutting down the number of especially accounting questions, 
devising a screening procedure to use with the general manager to find the right 
persons to answer the other parts 
 
After several rounds of revision, GfK Russia still tested the questionnaire in a few firms 
before the final version was launched in April 2003 for interviewer training and 
consequent rollout of the survey in the regions. An interviewer manual was prepared to 
accompany the training. 
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Appendix 3 List of Regions 
 
All regions Selected 
regions 
Name of the region 
Number 
of Firms
percentage 
of Firms
percentage 
of Firms 
  
Adygeya republic 7 0.2  
Altai krai 54 1.53 2.23 
Amur oblast 6 0.17  
Arkhangelsk oblast 50 1.42 1.93 
Astrakhan oblast 11 0.31  
Bashkortostan republic 108 3.07  
Belgorod oblast 49 1.39 1.89 
Bryansk oblast 51 1.45  
Buryat republic 12 0.34  
Chelyabinsk oblast 112 3.18 4.33 
Chita oblast 5 0.14  
Chuvash republic 47 1.33 1.93 
Dagestan republic 14 0.4  
Evrei autonomous oblast 4 0.11  
Irkutsk oblast 59 1.67 2.06 
Ivanovo oblast 65 1.85 2.61 
Kabardino-Balkar republic 9 0.26  
Kaliningrad oblast 22 0.62 0.92 
Kaluga oblast 36 1.02 1.51 
Kamchatka oblast 8 0.23  
Karachaevo-Cherkess republic 7 0.2  
Karelia republic 25 0.71 0.84 
Kemerovo oblast 79 2.24 3.19 
Khabarovsk krai 30 0.85 1.22 
Khakasia republic 9 0.26  
Khanty-Mansi autonomous okrug* 0 0  
Kirov oblast 57 1.62 2.10 
Komi republic 29 0.82  
Kostroma oblast 29 0.82 1.22 
Krasnodar krai 95 2.7  
Krasnoyarsk krai 74 2.1 2.86 
Kurgan oblast 20 0.57  
Kursk oblast 46 1.31  
Leningrad oblast 44 1.25 1.64 
Lipetsk oblast 41 1.16 1.68 
Mari-El republic 24 0.68  
Mordovia republic 27 0.77 1.09 
Moscow city 201 5.71 7.73 
Moskow oblast 183 5.19 7.36 
Murmansk oblast 18 0.51  
Nizhny Novgorod oblast 114 3.24  
North Osetiya republic 10 0.28  
Novgorod oblast 26 0.74  
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Novosibirsk oblast 52 1.48  
Omsk oblast 32 0.91 1.30 
Orenburg oblast 35 0.99 1.47 
Oryol oblast 29 0.82  
Penza oblast 42 1.19  
Perm oblast 96 2.72 3.61 
Primorskii krai 48 1.36 1.68 
Pskov oblast 22 0.62  
Rostov oblast 77 2.19 2.86 
Ryazan oblast 27 0.77  
Sakha (Yakutia) republic 5 0.14  
Sakhalin oblast 5 0.14  
Samara oblast 80 2.27 3.11 
Saratov oblast** 0 0  
Smolensk oblast 37 1.05 1.51 
St. Petersburg city 141 4 5.51 
Stavropol krai 31 0.88 1.18 
Sverdlovsk oblast 154 4.37 6.26 
Tambov oblast 31 0.88  
Tatarstan republic 100 2.84 3.78 
Tomsk oblast 28 0.79 0.97 
Tula oblast 56 1.59  
Tuva republic 1 0.03  
Tver oblast 61 1.73  
Tyumen oblast 34 0.97 1.09 
Udmurtia Republic 39 1.11 1.60 
Ulyanovsk oblast 44 1.25 1.85 
Vladimir oblast 68 1.93 2.73 
Volgograd oblast 60 1.7 2.40 
Vologda oblast 50 1.42 1.89 
Voronezh oblast 60 1.7 2.40 
Yaroslavl oblast 59 1.67 2.44 
o/w Koryak autonomous okrug 2 0.06  
    
Total 3523 100 100 
 
*Goskomstat database contains only extraction and energy firms for this region 
** Goskomstat database does not contain employment information for the year 2000 for 
the firms in this region 
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APPENDIX 4 Costs and Income from Social Services in 2002 (accounting figures relative to wage bill, percentages) 
 
For firms where costs/income are 
positive 
Type of 
Services 
Type of costs/income % of firms 
were 
positive 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Number of 
Observations 
Minimum Mean Median 
Current costs*   39.45 3.42 30.32 507.10 289 0.007 8.66 1.73 
Subsidies to workers 12.15 0.21 1.37 16.67 288 0.001 1.70 0.33 
Support of housing 
transferred to municipality 
8.65 0.45 2.59 28.08 289 0.129 5.24 1.24 
Housing 
Other costs 2.68 0.03 0.28 4.11 298 0.019 1.02 0.34 
Current costs*   66.44 1.04 6.59 109.30 289 0.004 1.57 0.50 
Subsidies to workers 38.95 0.64 6.82 114.29 285 0.004 1.65 0.17 
Support of municipal medical 
sphere 
6.25 0.01 0.06 0.53 288 0.009 0.18 0.10 
Medical 
Other costs 6.44 0.03 0.17 2.49 295 0.002 0.42 0.27 
Current costs*  15.12 1.12 8.96 136.73 291 0.160 7.40 2.48 
Subsidies to workers 10.00 0.12 1.36 22.95 290 0.003 1.21 0.30 
Support of municipal daycare 5.88 0.06 0.50 6.47 289 0.029 0.98 0.13 
Daycare 
Other costs 4.03 0.01 0.16 2.73 298 0.011 0.32 0.06 
Current costs*   20.34 0.93 8.63 144.19 290 0.036 4.56 1.07 
Subsidies to workers 44.37 1.13 14.00 235.96 284 0.005 2.54 0.29 
Support of municipal 
recreation sphere 
1.04 0.00 0.01 0.14 288 0.007 0.05 0.01 
Recreation 
Other costs 4.36 0.18 2.00 33.56 298 0.070 4.17 1.67 
 Total cost  (all of the above) 91.98 7.71 41.24 616.39 262 0.004 8.38 2.38 
Housing 42.16 2.77 16.50 244.50 287 0.003 6.58 0.69 
Medical 5.54 0.07 0.87 14.68 289 0.004 1.32 0.39 
Daycare 12.71 1.01 8.45 92.82 291 0.011 7.94 0.50 
Recreation 19.57 0.59 6.33 102.85 276 0.001 3.01 0.30 
Income 
received from 
Total income  (all of the 
above) 
55.02 4.08 19.54 244.50 269 0.005 7.41 0.94 
*Current costs of running the assets owned by the firm 
